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ABSTRACT 
 
 
When government officials express intent to disparage or discriminate 
against a group, the constitutional consequences can be severe, but 
they are rarely imposed.  In this Article, I argue that discriminatory 
motive is and should be enough to declare government acts 
unconstitutional.  Second, I argue that the main reason why is the 
harm to government legitimacy.  While some argue that the concern 
with intentional discrimination is its harm, such as its stigmatizing 
effect, I argue that the focus should not be on harm, but on how it 
delegitimizes government.  I make the descriptive claim that 
Constitutional doctrine, in its broad outlines, reflects a legitimacy-
based view.  In the Equal Protection context, courts have set out how 
discriminatory goals are not legitimate state interests. In the 
Executive action context, courts state that absent a legitimate and 
bona fide justification, the Executive may not have power delegated 
from Congress to act.  What courts have not done is specified what 
happens when the hammer falls: how intent disables government 
policymaking and for how long.  The legitimacy-focused approach can 
neutralize government decisions, even when the government tries to 
re-do its policy and claim new reasons.  Third, I argue that a 
legitimacy-focused approach towards constitutional intent doctrine 
that I advance in this Article is normatively preferable.  The approach 
does incentivize insincere reasons for government actions.  However, I 
argue that advantages outweigh those costs.  There are real benefits to 
even insincere expressions of non-discrimination.  Conversely, when 
the government makes discriminatory statements, this is very strong 
evidence of discriminatory motive.  During a time of nationwide 
litigation of intentional discrimination claims in areas including 
immigration rights, voting rights, and religious non-establishment, it 
has never been more important to set out the doctrine, the costs, and 
the consequences of unconstitutionally illegitimate intent. 
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UNCONSTITUTIONALLY ILLEGITIMATE DISCRIMINATION 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 If the government itself makes disparaging statements about a group 
of people, that alone should be enough to render government action 
unconstitutional.  That principle should be straightforward.  However, courts 
have not been clear about either the consequences of discriminatory intent or 
the reasons why intent matters.  In this Article, I show why discriminatory 
intent has systematically corrosive effects on government legitimacy.  I argue 
that a legitimacy-based approach should be foundational in constitutional 
anti-discrimination doctrine.  As Justice Sandra Day O’Connor put it, 
“disapproval of a group cannot be a legitimate government interest.”1 Judges 
do not casually make findings of unconstitutional intent, since doing so can 
disable the government actors from making policy at all—but imposing those 
severe consequences can also help to prevent even greater social harm.   
Take as an example the Alabama Constitution, which in 1901 was 
amended to include a provision disenfranchising any person convicted of a 
crime of “moral turpitude.”2  In 1985, the U.S. Supreme Court, with Chief 
Justice William Rehnquist writing a unanimous opinion in Hunter v. 
Underwood, concluded that although over eighty years had passed, the 
amendment was enacted with the intent to disenfranchise black voters.3 
Alabama lawmakers admitted their goal was to “establish white supremacy,” 
and they selected a wide range of serious and petty crimes believed “to be 
more frequently committed by blacks.”4  The harm was not just the ugly view 
expressed by the measure.  The harm was not just the direct impairment of 
voters’ rights.  Indeed, the harm to victims does not fully captured the 
constitutional problem—which was systemic and structural.  The cost was to 
the legitimacy of democracy in the state of Alabama.  One goal of this Article 
is to set out more fully the scope the cost of intentional discrimination.   
A decade after the Justices struck down that amendment, Alabama 
adopted enacted a new “moral turpitude” amendment, applying this time 
only to felonies. Thus far, challenges to the new voting restriction have failed.  
Should they?5 
Judges sometimes note that action tainted by unconstitutional intent 
might be valid if it were to be hypothetically enacted today absent that taint.  
The Justices suggested as much in dicta in the Hunter decision.6  What if the 
                                                
1 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 581 2003) (O’Connor, concurring) (referring to “moral 
disapproval” of a group; the focus here is on intentional discrimination more broadly).  
2 Ala. Const. of 1901, art. VIII, § 182. 
3 471 U.S. 222, 226 (1985). 
4 Id.  
5 See Chapman v. Gooden, 974 So. 2d 972, 976 (Ala. 2007). 
6 471 U.S. at 232. 
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action, though, is re-enacted to try to “cure” the taint of unconstitutional 
intent?  Such rulings raise the question: when government officials express 
discriminatory intent or disapproval of groups of people, what should be the 
full set of constitutional consequences?  A stronger appreciation for the 
systematic and structural cost of discrimination can help one to better 
answer such questions.  This Article seeks to explore those challenging 
questions by proposing a new test that focuses the analysis not on the harm 
to victims, or even to the general public, but on the effect of intentional 
discrimination on the legitimacy of government itself.  I argue that the cost to 
legitimacy, reflected in some but certainly not all of the doctrine, should be 
the primary focus of constitutional analysis.   
The cost of discriminatory bias infecting government action, whether it 
is a criminal trial, an immigration order, a local regulation, or a federal 
statute, can be so great that the Supreme Court has held official action to a 
very different standard with unconstitutional intent or purpose is invoked.  
The Court has set out a complex intent standard in its Equal Protection 
Clause doctrine—one that is neither purely objective or subjective and with 
several factors that give judges a great deal of discretion.7  Many have raised 
the concern that intent or purpose standards can be used to sweep 
discrimination under the rug, since it is often difficult to show that officials 
acted with the requisite intent. 8  Discriminatory intent doctrine has been 
widely seen as a judicial tool to limit anti-discrimination remedies. Without 
disagreeing with those concerns, in this Article I acknowledge that the 
doctrine may reward superficial or even insincere expression of neutrality or 
non-discriminatory intent.  Such expressions can also have an important and 
underappreciated function, however.  The doctrine pushes government away 
from corrosive and disparaging statements and towards reasoned 
policymaking.  This is the legitimacy-building function of intent doctrine. 
We should revisit the importance of strongly incentivizing legitimacy, 
including through neutral public statements that do not disparage groups.  
There is great value, I argue, to sweeping such discrimination out of public 
discourse.  One hopes that government decisionmakers would not often 
outright admit that they acted based on invidious intent. However, when 
politics do become divisive, and we have entered an era of extreme partisan 
                                                
7 See, e.g. Daniel R. Ortiz, The Myth of Intent in Equal Protection, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1105, 
1113-14 (1989); David Strauss, Discriminatory Intent and Taming of Brown, 59 U CHI. L. 
REV. 935, 947 (1989); Michael Selmi, Proving Intentional Discrimination: The Reality of 
Supreme Court Rhetoric, 86 GEO. L. REV. 279 (1997); Aziz Z. Huq, Judging Discriminatory 
Intent, 103 CORNELL L. REV. __ (2017); Russell K. Robinson, Unequal Protection, 68 STAN. L. 
REV. 151 (2016).  
8 Suzanne Goldbert, Discrimination by Comparison, 120 YALE L. J. 728, 728 (2011); Chad 
Derum & Karen Engle, The Rise of the Personal Animosity Presumption in Title VII and the 
Return to “No Cause” Employment, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1177, 1207 (2003) (noting that “no 
sensible employer would admit that it based a decision on one of the prohibited 
classifications”).  
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polarization in the United States,9 if not also inter-group conflict,10 judges 
may increasingly confront claims of discriminatory intent by government.   
Active national litigation over voting rights, immigration rights, and 
religious non-establishment all implicates questions of discriminatory intent.  
This Term, for example, the Supreme Court remanded for further 
proceedings in a case involving racially discriminatory views by a juror in a 
death penalty case.11 The Court initially scheduled arguments concerning a 
claim that the President’s remarks signaled intent to discriminate based on 
religion and ethnicity, before dismissing the suit as mooted; the Court has 
now scheduled arguments on a new round of such litigation.12 In the past 
Term, the Justices granted relief in a challenge to the use of race in 
districting,13 and in a jury discrimination case, calling the impact of racial 
bias among jurors “a familiar and recurring evil that, if left unaddressed, 
would risk systemic injury to the administration of justice.” 14  National 
litigation concerning voting rights, immigration orders, and religious 
discrimination, continues to raise claims of discriminatory intent.15  This 
Article argues that intent matters in such litigation specifically because of 
the de-legitimizing effect it has on government action.  
In some constitutional contexts, the Supreme Court has been clear why 
discriminatory intent is forbidden: because it has a system-wide 
delegitimizing effect. The Court has been quite clear that “slurs” or 
government actions that “disparage or injure” are strongly disfavored if not 
prohibited under the Equal Protection Clause, as well as under other 
constitutional provisions such as the First Amendment regarding the 
Establishment Clause and Free Exercise Clause 16 ; and the Fifteenth 
Amendment regarding voting rights discrimination.17 As the Court noted in 
                                                
9  See generally, Richard H. Pildes, Why the Center Does Not Hold: The Causes of 
Hyperpolarized Democracy in America, 99 CAL. L. REV. 273 (2011).  
10  On increased racial polarization among American voters, see, e.g. Leading Case, 
Fourteenth Amendment—Equal Protection Clause—Racial Gerrymandering—Cooper v. 
Harris (2017).  
11 Tharpe v. Sellers, 2018 WL 311568.  
12 Trump v. International Refugee Assistance Project, 137 S. Ct. 2080, 2086 (2017) (per 
curiam); Trump v. Hawaii,  2018WL 324357 (January 19, 2018) (cert. granted). 
13 Cooper v. Harris, 581 U.S. __ (2017).  
14 Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S.Ct. 855, 868 (2017).  
15 For a summary of ongoing voting access litigation, see Brennan Center for Justice, Major 
Litigation that Could Impact Voting Access (last visited on Nov. 27, 2017), at 
https://www.brennancenter.org/major-litigation-could-impact-voting-access.  For a detailed 
summary and timelines of the Executive Order litigation regarding the three travel ban 
orders, see NAFSA, Executive Order Entry Ban Litigation Update, Nov. 21, 2017, at 
http://www.nafsa.org/Professional_Resources/Browse_by_Interest/International_Students_an
d_Scholars/Executive_Order_Entry_Ban_Litigation_Updates/.  
16 Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 43, 56 (1985) (Establishment Clause); Church of the 
Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 533 (1993) (Free Exercise Clause).  
17 E.g. League of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 440 (2006).  
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City of Richmond, “gross racial slurs” intended to single out black citizens can 
be forbidden and have “no legitimacy at all under our Constitution.”18  The 
focus is not on how long the harm lasts or what type of harm it is.  The 
purpose is to delegitimize action premised on such slurs.  Such language 
supports my view in this Article.  Or, as the Court has put it in the First 
Amendment context, the concern is with expression of “hostility” towards 
religion. 19   Constitutional rules debilitating government action based on 
disparagement directed at groups serve to strongly discourage such intent 
from expression.  The Court has noted that the hope is that such tests are not 
often “fatal” because government fortunately “does not generally act 
unconstitutionally.”20  Recent rulings have revived the role of intent in cases 
involving due process and equal protection claims.  For example, Obergefell v. 
Hodges emphasized denial to same-sex couples of the right to marry 
expressed “disapproval of their relationships” and “serves to disrespect and 
subordinate them.” 21  In United States v. Windsor, the Court highlighted 
legitimacy concerns still more powerfully, stating that “no legitimate purpose 
overcomes the purpose and effect to disparage and to injure those whom the 
State, by its marriage laws, sought to protect in personhood and dignity.”22 
As I describe in Part I of this Article, the doctrine in a wide range of 
constitutional contexts regarding explicit claims of discrimination based on 
race, religion, gender identity and many others, whether referred to as a 
claim of an unconstitutional intent, purpose, animus claims, or “rational 
basis with bite,” reflects a framework to handle a wide range of situations in 
which officials make discriminatory decisions.23 In Part I of this Article, I 
summarize that caselaw and surrounding doctrine, but I focus on the doctrine 
concerning the effect of evidence of unconstitutional intent on the 
government.  I do not seek to engage with questions regarding what the 
definition of intent is or should be under the Equal Protection Clause, or for 
other constitutional and statutory discrimination claims.  While I agree with 
many scholars that any definition should include both subjective and 
objective evidence of discriminatory intent, the focus here is not on evidence, 
nor on questions such as how to prove intent for multi-member bodies that 
deliberate.24  I argue that questions of definition and evidentiary proof, while 
                                                
18 City of Richmond v. U.S., 422 U.S. 369, 378-79 (1975). 
19 Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 673 (1984). 
20 McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky, 545 U.S. 844, 863 (2005).  
21 135 S.Ct. 2584, 2604 (2015).  See also U.S. v. Windsor, 133 S.Ct. 2675, 2696 (2013) (“no 
legitimate purpose overcomes the purpose and effect to disparage and to injure those whom 
the State, by its marriage laws, sought to protect in personhood and dignity.”)  For discussion 
of the role of public reason in the decision, see, e.g. Robert Katz, The Role of Public Reason in 
Obergefell v. Hodges, 11 FIU L. REV. 177 (2015). 
22 U.S. v. Windsor, 133 S.Ct. 2675, 2696 (2013).   
23 See infra Part I.A.  
24 See, e.g. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Constitutionally Forbidden Legislative Intent, 130 HARV. 
L. REV. 523, 530-31 (2016) (“I do not analyze the partly parallel problems that arise when 
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important in the law of discriminatory intent, are preceded by the 
overarching goal of intent doctrines: to prevent the institutionally corrosive 
effect of intentional discrimination on government.  We should all be able to 
agree that disparaging statements by government are unconstitutional.   
Second, I argue that the reason why is legitimacy.  The message 
matters because of what it says about the speaker.  In Part I, argue that 
discriminatory statements may damage the government official far more 
than any others. Importantly, the cost of disapproval and disparagement of 
groups is itself extremely broad and hard to cabin.  Branding a group of 
persons can cause legal and expressive harms beyond the particular group 
singled out and beyond the particular government action at issue.  I argue 
that the systemic cost explains why the consequences can be severe. 
In Part II, I develop how a legitimacy-focused inquiry has structural 
implications for government, First, I develop how evidence discriminatory 
intent can undermine government defenses to a constitutional claim.  Second, 
I develop how a legitimacy-based approach towards discriminatory intent 
incentivizes neutral and non-discriminatory government action.  Third, I 
argue that evidence of ill intent can help with an argument that the 
government has exceeded the bounds of its structural power to act.  
Normally, the Court favors “government statements of purpose” that are 
benign, because we want the government to speak in a non-disparaging way.  
If the government departs from that stance, though, then it will not easily 
defend its actions.  Going still farther, in a set of areas, the government may 
lose far more: acting in an intentionally disparaging way may place the 
government’s actions outside of the limits of its constitutionally recognized 
power.  Its actions may be constitutionally illegitimate.  Rulings regarding 
the non-enumerated “plenary” immigration power have this character, since 
the implied power to regulate entry into the country at the federal level exists 
only when not in conflict with other constitutional powers and limits. 
Part III turns to questions of what happens when the hammer falls: 
how much the government can lose legitimacy, for how long, in what 
circumstances, and with what constitutional implications.  I argue that at 
minimum, it is strong evidence of discriminatory intent when the government 
makes disparaging statements.  I develop how when the government does so, 
the consequences can be severe: government actors may be forbidden from 
carrying out their policies, and for quite some time, since courts may be loath 
                                                                                                                                            
single officials--such as prosecutors, other executive officials, or judges--act for 
constitutionally forbidden purposes.”); John Hart Ely, Legislative and Administrative 
Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79 YALE L.J. 1205 (1970).  That problem is not the focus 
here.  Nor is the focus on what happens when policymakers base decisions on “naked 
preferences” that disadvantage others, as Cass Sunstein has put it.  Cass Sunstein, Naked 
Preferences and the Constitution, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1689 (1984).  Instead, the focus is on 
the de-legitimizing effect of discriminatory intent, if it is proven, and what impact it has on 
government action.  I discuss Richard Fallon’s arguments in Parts I and II. 
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to trust their motives if they quickly claim to have re-done the policy claiming 
newly clean hands.  The taint of constitutionally illegitimate intent may 
persist so long as the relevant action is taken.  As the Supreme Court has put 
it, “the world is not made brand new every morning.”25  The intent may 
impugn the motives of the speaker and undermine any non-discriminatory 
reasons offered to defend government action, including because they may 
place the action beyond the power of the government to act.  
This Article concludes by developing why “purpose matters,” not just 
because ill-intent harms, but because it is corrosive of government 
legitimacy.26  It is so corrosive that the government cannot quickly repair 
that legitimacy. The blunt instrument of intent doctrine accomplishes an 
important goal: to exile discriminatory statements from public discourse and 
decisionmaking. I argue courts rightly impose grave constitutional 
consequences on government actors that act outside legitimate bounds.  What 
is good public policy can and should be disputed.  However, disparaging 
groups is never acceptable as legitimate government.  Intent standards have 
practical limitations, and critics are right to point to difficulties in defining 
and proving intent.  The underappreciated virtue of the doctrine is that it 
seeks to banish explicit discrimination from public life.  Although intent 
standards can be vaguely defined, that too can carry with it the virtue of 
deterring extremely damaging conduct.  In an increasingly pluralistic society, 
it is particularly important to ensure that groups do not use the law to 
establish status hierarchy.  The doctrine of unconstitutionally illegitimate 
intent is important in modern democracies as never before. 
 
I.  WHY INTENT? 
 
Why does intent matter in so many areas of constitutional law? For 
decades, the Supreme Court has often found unconstitutional laws that 
express a denigrating or discriminatory purpose.  In Brown v. Board of 
Education, the Court emphasized how “[s]eparate educational facilities are 
inherently unequal.”27  The Court did not discuss whether the discrimination 
was intentional or not, and when ruling on de jure discrimination, it did not 
need to do so.  The focus on intent or purpose on constitutional standards, 
whether in the Equal Protection context, or in other contexts, such as the 
First Amendment, Dormant Commerce Clause, or the Sixth Amendment, 
would emerge later, beginning in the 1970s.  During that time, scholars first 
began to grapple with when and whether intent or purpose or motive should 
matter in constitutional law.  There is a large literature on the evidentiary 
challenges of assessing intent, particularly for collective bodies like 
legislatures.  There is a large literature on how to define unconstitutional 
                                                
25 McCreary, 545 U.S. at 866.  
26 Id. at n.14.   
27 Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954). 
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intent or purpose.  There is less analysis of why intent might matter in the 
first instance.  That is the focus of this Part.   
Asking why intent matters may initially “seem silly.”28  One important 
and neglected reason why intent matters is because government action that 
intentionally discriminates is itself illegitimate: it cannot be justified as in 
the public interest, not just because it harms groups but because it is not in 
the public interest to demean or disparage a group.  In this Part, I defend the 
idea that whatever discriminatory intent means, it is enough to declare 
government action unconstitutional.   
I begin by describing what the theory is of legitimacy that animates 
this project and why legitimacy of government policy and action matters as a 
background principle in constitutional law.  Second, I turn to intent doctrine 
in constitutional law and the role that legitimacy plays in it.  Third, I 
describe how despite differing definitions of intent and purpose in 
constitutional law, a common focus on legitimacy remains in the doctrine.  
Fourth, I contrast the view of intent and legitimacy with theories of 
expressive harm in constitutional law. 
 
A. Legitimacy in Constitutional Doctrine 
The Supreme Court has emphasized across a range of constitutional 
doctrines that the harm of purposeful or intentional acts directed at groups is 
that they de-legitimize government and harm society broadly.  Quite a bit of 
scholarship treats intent as an evidentiary issue; for example, Richard 
Fallon’s recent article takes as its starting place the concern that in existing 
doctrine, the problem is that the courts have set out “varied approaches to 
the identification of legislative intent.”29  That is, the scholarship assumes 
that the problem is whether a plaintiff can make out a constitutional 
violation.  Intent by government officials, under such an approach, serves an 
evidentiary function: it is something that must be shown in order to make out 
a claim that the constitution was in fact violated.  When the assumption is 
that intent serves an evidentiary and instrumental role, then unsurprisingly, 
the question turns to the challenges of securing the evidence to prove the 
relevant type of intent.  The main focus, then, for Fallon, is the area in which 
there is the greatest evidentiary challenge, in his view, and that is in gauging 
intentions of multimember legislative bodies.30   
If, however, the purpose served by intent or purpose tests is different 
and not simply evidentiary, then the doctrine does not pose the same 
problems.  In this Article, I focus on a different conception of the role that 
intent plays in the doctrine can: discriminatory intent is itself a 
constitutional evil.  Intent, purpose, animus, or whatever the label, does not 
                                                
28 William D. Araiza, Animus: A Short Introduction to Bias in Law 2 (2017).  
29 Fallon, supra note xxx at 530-31. 
30 Id. at 530.  
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serve purely an evidentiary role in smoking out government action and 
identifying it as truly discriminatory.  There are challenges in obtaining 
evidence of discriminatory intent and there are challenges in defining 
discriminatory intent.  It is useful to explore those challenges in legal 
scholarship and in the courts.  However, intent standards serve a different 
and more fundamental role.  Discriminatory intent, whether it is indicative of 
underlying goals or not, is itself de-legitimizing.  It itself is an illegitimate 
reason for government to act.  If discriminatory intent impacts legitimacy, 
that raises a preliminary and more fundamental question: what does 
legitimacy mean in the context of Government action, whether legislative or 
regulatory or enforcement related?   
The concept of legitimacy refers to some bound of permissible publicly 
interested action.  Public reason theories of government, following the work 
of John Rawls, develop in detail a moral account of government action 
requiring that there be a public-minded and reasoned basis for government 
decisionmaking.31  Rawls emphasized in his work that “[p]ublic reason is 
characteristic of a democratic people: it is the reason of its citizens [as such], 
of those sharing the status of equal citizenship.”32  A central principle in that 
work is that of legitimacy. 33   Public reason requires some notion of 
reciprocity, or enacting measures that all free citizens might also reasonably 
endorse as desirable.  Action that grossly harms the public may not be 
illegitimate if it is within the discretion of government officials; government 
officials do not need to make wise and sound policy choices.  However, actions 
that are sound policy choices, conversely, may be illegitimate if adopted for 
purely religious reasons. The contours of what counts as government actions 
based on public reason and which do not, under Rawl’s theory or those of 
other moral philosophers, are well beyond the scope of this project, as are 
critiques of Rawl’s theory of legitimacy and public reason.34   
What is straightforward under accounts of public reason is that 
discriminatory actions are not legitimate and not supported by public reason.  
As William Araiza puts it, government “at least has to seek to promote a 
public purpose.”  It is clearly not legitimate and not tolerable to harm people 
“just because a political majority doesn’t like them.”35  Discriminatory action 
that is intended to harm groups of citizens is highly corrosive and is treated 
across a range of contexts as different from routine policy choices that 
                                                
31 John Rawls, POLITICAL LIBERALISM (1996).  See also id. at 136 (“[O]ur exercise of political 
power is fully proper only when it is exercised in accordance with a constitution the 
essentials of which are all citizens as free and equal may reasonably be expected to endorse 
in light of principles and ideals acceptable to their common human reason.”). 
32 Id. at 213. 
33 Id. at 137.  
34 See, e.g. Elizabeth H. Wolgast, The Demands of Public Reason, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1936 
(1994). Regarding which officials are bound by public reason, see Lawrence Solum, Public 
Legal Reason, 92 Virginia L. Rev. 1449, 1476-78 (2006). 
35 Araiza, supra note xxx at 2.  
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incidentally advantage some and disadvantage others.  As John Hart Ely has 
put it: “To disadvantage a group essentially out of dislike is surely to deny its 
members equal concern and respect, specifically by valuing their welfare 
negatively.”36  There is also a larger moral question whether judicial review is 
broadly necessary for action that is not supported by public reason and is 
therefore illegitimate.  Micah Schwartzman has convincingly argued as 
much, using as the frame of reference John Rawl’s conception of public 
reason.37  Schwartzman argues that courts should properly ask about the 
motivations of public actors and whether their actions are supported by 
public goals, as opposed to, for example, desire to discriminate.38 
This concept of legitimacy mirrors the conception of the common good 
underlying James Madison’s theory of sound republican government in the 
Federalist. 39  Madison argued that the entire design of the Constitution 
sought to “restrain” as against “legal discriminations” the corrupting 
influence of “factions,” in which a group acted against or in favor of “a 
particular class of the society.”40  As Madison put it at the Constitutional 
Convention, the “injustice” to be prevented was that of “the majority 
trampling on the rights of the minority.”41  Madison described as examples of 
such “injustice,” legislation that exhibited “partiality,” because it would 
create inequality, or it would be adverse to “aggregate interests of the 
community.”42  According to Madison, this danger, that of “faction,” was the 
central danger faced by democracy: the “mortal disease. . . of republican 
government, unless it is carefully controlled.” 43   The U.S. constitutional 
structure, as Howard Gillman has described, was intended to “preempt” 
factional politics and encourage the view that “legitimate government 
exercised power disinterestedly to advance a transcendent general welfare.”44  
Madison himself, however, was not satisfied that the constitutional design 
did enough to protect against oppression of minority groups at the state level, 
particularly.  Madison pushed throughout the Constitutional Convention for 
the adoption of a “negative” permitting a federal revision commission to 
strike down state legislation that abused minority rights, but was 
                                                
36 John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust at 157. 
37  Micah Schwartzman, Must Laws be Motivated by Public Reason? (draft on file with 
author).  
38 Id. 
39 For a detailed development of those ideas, see James Liebman and Brandon L. Garrett, 
Madisonian Equal Protection, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 807 (2004).  
40 The Federalist, No. 10, 62 (James Madison).  
41  See James Madison, Debates at the Virginia Convention (June 6, 1788), in 9 The 
Documentary History of the Ratification of the Constitution 989, 989-990 (John P. Kaminski 
& Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1990).  
42 The Federalist No. 51, 78 (James Madison). 
43 The Federalist, No. 10, 77 (James Madison). 
44 Howard Gillman, The Constitution Beseiged (1993).  
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unsuccessful in convincing fellow delegates of the merits the approach.45 The 
Bill of Rights and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, go farther towards realizing the Madisonian vision of an 
additional check as against discriminatory state and local action that harms 
minorities.46  Whether the Equal Protection Clause in particular does enough 
to safeguard minority rights has depended on the degree to which the courts 
enforce it carefully. 47  The dependence in our system on judicially-enforced 
rights to safeguard minority rights makes it all the more important that 
judges have the right concept of legitimacy underlying their work. 
The concept of legitimacy used throughout this Article is a moral 
concept of legitimacy.  In an important article, Richard Fallon has usefully 
broken out several concepts of legitimacy that are relevant to constitutional 
law.48  As a legal concept legitimacy refers to compliance with legal norms.49  
A sociological concept of legitimacy refers to acceptance of a constitutional 
claim by the public, or relatedly, acquiescence in that claim.50  The moral 
concept of legitimacy that I discuss here is focused on the moral justification 
for a claim of constitutional authority. 51   The difference can sometimes 
matter for the arguments discussed in this Article.  For example, if it is a 
sociological fact that many people espouse a racially discriminatory view, for 
example in favor of segregation, then that may affect sociological arguments 
that courts should be reluctant to interfere with public opinion, but they are 
not relevant to claims of moral legitimacy.  Or a claim that an approach is 
                                                
45 See Liebman and Garrett, supra note 38.  
46 See id.  
47  See id. (arguing that even the Equal Protection Clause of 1868 did not sufficiently 
structure protections against oppressive state action).  
48 Richard H. Fallon, Legitimacy and the Constitution, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1187 (2005). 
49 Id. at 1187. 
50 Id. at 1187.  In this Article, I do not develop the implications of a sociological concept of 
legitimacy.  Such a focus would not, in my view, track much of constitutional intent doctrine.  
However, an approach relying on sociological legitimacy would have certain benefits.  It 
would be more grounded in social fact, and it might help to explain compliance with the law 
that psychologists have shown can sometimes be affected by perceptions of legitimacy as a 
factor.  See, e.g. Tom Tyler, Psychological Perspectives on Legitimacy and Legitimation, 57 
Ann. Rev. Psychol. 375 (2006); Tom Tyler, Why People Obey the Law (2006).  Such an 
approach, however, would require careful empirical investigation of public attitudes.  See, 
e.g. Aziz Z. Huq, Jonathan Jackson, and Rick Trinker, Acts that Legitimate: Widening the 
Array of Predicate Policing Practices (2016), at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2740631 (developing broader array of 
practices that impact individual assessment of the legitimacy of police). Such an approach 
would then require asking questions about what types of discriminatory government action 
created reduction in public support for government.  Further, where it is minority rights that 
are the target, then majority views may correctly be irrelevant social facts to a claim of 
discrimination. 
51 Fallon, supra note xxx, at 1187. 
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consistent with legal precedent may satisfy legal legitimacy concerns, but not 
moral legitimacy concerns.52   
A clarification in that literature is also important to the argument I 
develop in this Article.  Matthew Adler has argued that constitutional rights 
are “rights against rules,” and have derivative moral content giving people a 
right to be free from government action based on a rule that is morally 
problematic.53  The focus is not on whether a “moral wrong” was done to the 
plaintiff, but rather on the moral reason to change the rule that government 
actors relied upon.54 As I develop in this Article, the focus on the legitimacy of 
government places the emphasis on the moral status of government, and not 
on the harm, expressive or otherwise, to individuals.  This also has 
implications for how rights are litigated; if they are conceived more as shields 
against particular actions or rules (Adler’s argument is about rules) then 
doctrines regarding standing and remedies may also have to be reconsidered. 
Whether it is morally required that courts take such a view regarding 
legitimacy and public reason, a topic that I do not address, it is descriptively 
accurate to say that the U.S. Constitution supports judicial review designed 
to assess the motivations of public actors.55  In a range of constitutional 
contexts, the Supreme Court has asked courts to do precisely that.  The Court 
has highlighted how “moral disapproval of a group cannot be a legitimate 
government interest.”56  The next subsections turn to that doctrine.   
 
B. Discriminatory Intent Doctrines 
Constitutional doctrine and theory recognize that discriminatory acts 
targeting groups by virtue of their group membership are not acceptable as 
public policy.  The problem of discriminatory intent is not limited to the 
problem that intent is manifested in subjective but hard-to-pin-down 
motivations of the relevant actors, and nor that the message conveyed is 
hurtful to the group itself.  Nor is the only problem that discriminatory intent 
is defined poorly and hard to prove.  Nor is the problem of discriminatory 
intent that it harms individuals, through outcomes, or stigmatizing 
expression.  Rather, I argue, the central problem that should be the focus of 
doctrine is the corrosive effect on government itself of having acted based on 
discriminatory reasons.  An analysis of relevant areas of constitutional 
                                                
52 Regarding the need for authority to be both just and legitimate, see John Simmons, 
Justification and Legitimacy, 109 Ethics 739, 752-53 (1999). 
53 Matthew D. Adler, Rights Against Rules: The Moral Structure of American Constitutional 
Law, 97 MICH, L. REV. 1, 3-4 (1998). 
54 Id. 
55 See, e.g. John Ferejohn and Barry Friedman, Toward a Political Theory of Constitutional 
Default Rules, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 825, 836 (2006) (“The idea that policy ought to be 
grounded in reason, perhaps in public reason, may also ground certain constitutional 
defaults.”). 
56 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 581 2003) (O’Connor, concurring).  
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doctrine can help to explain that underlying function of intent rules, although 
I will point out how not all doctrine is consistent with my approach, given the 
complex and evolving uses of intent in different constitutional areas.   
My goal in the sections to follow is to excavate the central role of 
(moral) legitimacy in discriminatory intent doctrine.  I make the descriptive 
claim that constitutional doctrine reflects the legitimacy based review 
advanced here, in (1) First Amendment doctrine, including the Establishment 
Clause; (2) Equal Protection doctrine, including the doctrines of 
unconstitutional animus and purpose; (3) voting rights cases; (4) Sixth 
Amendment jury discrimination claims; (5) Dormant Commerce Clause; and 
(6) the structural doctrine of bad faith Executive action. 
 
1. Purpose Under the First Amendment 
At times the Justices have raised evidentiary concerns with fixing the 
motivations of legislators.  In United States v. O’Brien, Chief Justice Earl 
Warren explained that “Inquiries into congressional motives or purposes are 
a hazardous matter,” and might involve voiding a statute based on “what 
fewer than a handful of Congressmen said about it.”57  Moreover, perhaps 
lawmakers could reenact the law “in its exact form if the same or another 
legislator made a ‘wiser’ speech about it.” 58  However, in the First 
Amendment setting, the Supreme Court has largely abandoned that concern 
and proceeded to make inquiry into motivation, or intent, a central feature of 
the doctrine.59 
Take the Establishment Clause.  The problem of religious preferences 
is not just that one religious group benefits and one comparatively suffers, 
although the concern with religious persecution is important.  As the Court 
has put it, the harm to victims of religious discrimination does not capture 
the full scope of the problem, which goes to the legitimacy of government 
itself: the drafters of the First Amendment believed entanglement of 
government and religion “tends to destroy government and degrade 
religion.”60  Harm is not irrelevant.  Part of the concern, to be sure, is with 
religious persecution and the terrible harm that it causes to persons of the 
faith that is discriminated against.  However, harm is not necessary either.  
The Court may strike down “relatively insignificant” incursions because any 
governmental involvement in religion is forbidden by the Constitution.61  In 
approving a ceremonial town prayer in Town of Greece N.Y. v. Galloway, 
                                                
57 391 U.S. 367, 383-84 (1968). 
58 Id. at 383-84. 
59 In the speech context, the law of content-based restrictions on speech expresses a concern 
with preventing action taken with the purpose of targeting disfavored speech, as now-Justice 
Elena Kagan has influentially argued.  See Kagan, supra note xxx, at 443; see also Reed v. 
Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2228 (2015) and Fallon, supra note xxx, at 544-45.  
60 Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 431 (1962). 
61 Id. at 433. 
UNCONSTITUTIONALLY ILLEGITIMATE DISCRIMINATION 
 
 
 
 
13 
Justice Anthony Kennedy emphasized that in no way did the town board 
members “signal disfavor toward nonparticipants.”62  In its Establishment 
Clause cases, the Court has focused on whether government had a “secular 
purpose,” or rather exhibited “hostility” to a religion.63  The purpose of the 
Establishment Clause is not simply to remedy the harm of religious 
discrimination, but it serves a larger structural goal.  The goal is to prevent 
illegitimate government action that is derogatory towards one religious group 
or favoring another.  For that reason, under the Establishment Clause 
doctrine, purpose is understandably more important than the harm or the 
message sent to particular believers. 
 
2.  Animus, Intent, and Purpose Under the Equal Protection 
Clause 
In the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause context, the 
focus on discriminatory intent, purpose, and on the legitimacy of government 
action is central, but with several different tests adopted depending on the 
type of scrutiny or claim involved.  In Loving v. Virginia, the Supreme Court 
adopted a mixed approach, striking down the miscegenation statute because 
it contained a racial classification, which is presumed unconstitutional, but 
also because it reflect a legislative purpose to establish “White Supremacy.”64  
Fifty years later, the Supreme Court continues to adopt a mixed approach, 
focusing both on presence of racial classifications, but also examining purpose 
and intent behind government action.65 
The definition of what consists in discrimination depends on what level 
of scrutiny applies.  For claims of race, religion, national origin, and 
ethnicity-based discrimination, brought by groups that do have suspect class 
status for which strict scrutiny applies, the Court held in Washington v. 
Davis that alleging a pattern of discrimination can be enough only if that 
pattern is quite stark.  Typically, one must show a “discriminatory purpose” 
in order to show an equal protection violation.66 The Davis discriminatory 
purpose requirement was set out in response to evidence that a police 
qualification exam produced racially disparate results.  The Court stated that 
without more evidence of “discriminatory purpose,” that disparate outcomes 
alone may not suffice to show unconstitutional race discrimination. 67  
                                                
62 134 S.Ct. 1811 (2014).  
63 Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 673, 684 (1984).  
64 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967). 
65 Reva B. Siegel, From Colorblindness to Antibalkanization: An Emerging Group of Decision 
in Race Quality Cases, 120 YALE L. J. 1278, 1291-93 (2011) (describing the evolution of the 
relationship between the Court’s use of the anticlassification principle in its race equality 
decisions, and antisubordination principle focused on protecting members of disadvantaged 
groups from harms). 
66 Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).  
67 Id. at 239. 
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However, the Court made clear that discrimination need not appear on “the 
face of the statute,” and that evidence of application in practice is relevant 
and can lead to an inference of “invidious discriminatory purpose.”68  Cases 
dating back to Yick Wo v. Hopkins had supported claims based on egregiously 
disparate government application of the law.69  The “totality of the relevant 
facts” must be considered when deciding whether government action is 
motivated by “an invidious discriminatory purpose. 70  Cases regarding race 
segregation in education cases emphasized, similarly, a showing of de jure 
segregation, or a “purpose or intent to segregate.”71  
Subsequent cases have developed how one can make out that showing 
of discriminatory purpose or intent.  In Massachusetts v. Feeney, for example, 
the Justices more carefully defined what they meant by “discriminatory 
purpose.”  The Justice elaborated various factors that are relevant to a 
finding of discriminatory purpose, and ultimately found that a veteran’s 
preference in civil service hiring was not “overtly or covertly” purposeful 
gender discrimination despite a quite disproportionate impact on women.72  
Other recent rulings reflect situations in which actors had multiple reasons 
to target individuals; in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, the Court emphasized that non-
citizens were being detained due to suspected terror ties and not just due to 
race, religion or national origin.73   
Those equal protection rulings have been much criticized and they 
relate to how one defines purpose (is it subjective or objective, and can 
additional reasons support government action) and what evidence of purpose 
is relevant (the standard is not purely subjective, since discriminatory impact 
can be relevant, for example, to the inquiry.)  At the same time, scholars in 
the 1970s, such as Paul Brest and John Hart Ely, prominently began to argue 
that motive should be relevant to the inquiry whether government engaged in 
discrimination.74  The Justices themselves have expressed an understanding 
that it is not easy to define discriminatory purpose or what evidence suffices 
to prove it.  For example, in Miller v. Johnson, the Court noted that “[t]he 
                                                
68 Id. at 242.  
69 118 U.S. 356 (1886).  
70 Id. at 242.  
71 Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 199 (1973).  
72 Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 271 (1979). 
73 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1951 (2009). 
74  See, e.g. Paul Brest, The Supreme Court, 1975 Term — Foreword: In Defense of the 
Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1, 29 (1976) (advocating for motive-based 
review, but noting that “selective sympathy and indifference” might suffice since “[i]f courts 
may grant relief only when plaintiffs have made a clear case on the record, many instances 
will remain where race-dependent decisions are strongly suspected but cannot be proved.”); 
John Hart Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79 YALE 
L.J. 1205 (1970); John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review 136-
45 (1980).  
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distinction between being aware of racial considerations and being motivated 
by them may be difficult to make.”75 
The Justices have also elaborated a type of intent inquiry for cases in 
which no strict scrutiny applies.  In gender discrimination cases involving an 
intermediate form of scrutiny, the standard ultimately asks whether there 
was a purpose to engage in gender discrimination.  And in United States 
Department of Agriculture v Moreno, and cases involving claims of 
discrimination against groups that do not have “suspect class” status under 
the Equal Protection Clause, the Court has explained: “a bare congressional 
desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate 
governmental interest.”76   
Those rulings have also been criticized from a range of perspectives as 
not providing sufficiently clear or protective standards.  One central concern 
is that these purpose or intent doctrines do not end race, gender, or other 
group-based discrimination, but rather, as Reva Siegel puts it, can cause 
“such regulation to assume new form.”77  Or as David Baldus and colleagues 
put it, the Supreme Court’s decision in McCleskey v. Kemp finding 
insufficient showing of discriminatory “purpose” in substantial data they 
analyzed concerning death sentencing in Georgia, was part of “a long 
tradition of Supreme Court decisions imposing unattainable burdens of proof 
in order to deny and avoid claims of racial discrimination under the Equal 
Protection clause.”78 What is of interest here, though, is that this requirement 
of purpose is important to Equal Protection doctrine (at least where there is 
no express classification that receives strict scrutiny for that reason) and it 
has been for several decades. 
 
3.  Discriminatory Intent and Voting Rights 
In the voting rights context, regarding Fourteenth and Fifteenth 
Amendment legislation, the Supreme Court noted in City of Richmond, that 
“gross racial slurs” intended to single out black citizens, can be forbidden and 
have “no legitimacy at all under our Constitution.”79 Or, in 1970 is Gomillion 
v. Lightfoot, the Court held that a redistricting effort that excluded almost all 
of the black residents of Tuskegee Alabama was unconstitutional where acts 
“generally lawful may become unlawful when done to accomplish an unlawful 
end.”80  In contrast, the Justices tend to defer to districting when states base 
                                                
75 515 U.S. 900, 915 (1995).  
76 413 US 528, 533 (1973).  In general, absent strict or intermediate scrutiny, a classification 
challenged must be “rationally related to a legitimate state interest.” New Orleans v. 
Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976). 
77 Reva Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects: The Evolving Forms of Status-
Enforcing State Action, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1111 (1997).  
78 David Baldus et al, 263, in Death Penalty Stories, Carol and Jordan Steiker, eds. (2009). 
79 City of Richmond, 422 U.S. 358, 378-79 (1975). 
80 364 U.S. 339, 347 (1960). 
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decisions on “legitimate considerations.”81  In the voting context as well, the 
Justices have explained that it is not easy to define or prove what consists in 
“discriminatory purpose,” and that this “evidentiary difficulty,” along with 
the “the sensitive nature of redistricting and the presumption of good faith 
that must be accorded legislative enactments,” requires judges to “exercise 
extraordinary caution” when reviewing claims of race discrimination in 
districting.82  That said, while it is hard to put to one side those practical 
obstacles that the doctrine places in the way of relief for plaintiffs, the Court 
has also expressed in voting rights cases the reason why discriminatory 
purpose matters in that context.  The Court has emphasized that 
discrimination has larger effects beyond harming minority voters.  It may 
“balkanize us into competing racial factions” and this can “cause society 
serious harm.”83  That larger social harm is the focus of the analysis here: the 
effect on legitimacy of government. 
 
4. Discriminatory Intent and the Sixth Amendment 
In jury selection and deliberation cases concerning the Sixth 
Amendment, the Supreme Court’s cases have been quite clear that regardless 
how one measures the harm (and it is hard to quantify it), the institutional 
cost of racial bias infecting criminal trials is great.  That context provides a 
useful example for the principles discussed in this Article.  In that context, 
after all, the intent expressed by a juror is irrelevant to a theory of financial 
harm.  The juror is not being sued for damages.  The defendant is seeking to 
overturn a conviction, and the question is whether the intent of a juror 
tainted an entire trial. The Sixth Amendment focus is on the systematic 
repercussions of an expression of discriminatory intent.84 Thus, in the last 
term in Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado, the Court emphasized: 
 
The duty to confront racial animus in the justice system is not the 
legislature’s alone. Time and again, this Court has been called upon to 
enforce the Constitution’s guarantee against state-sponsored racial 
discrimination in the jury system.85 
 
The Court held that if a juror makes a “clear statement” that indicates 
reliance on “racial stereotypes or animus” then the trial court must consider 
whether there is a Sixth Amendment violation in that case.86  The Court 
                                                
81 Reynolds, 377 U.S., at 579.  
82 Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 916 (1995).  
83 Id. at 912 (quoting Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 657 (1993)).  
84 This was not always so, and for a description of the change in the Supreme Court’s 
jurisprudence regarding peremptory challenges, see Barry Friedman, Habeas and Hubris, 45 
VAND. L. REV. 797-98 (1992). 
85 Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S.Ct. 855, 867 (2017). 
86 Id. at 869. 
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emphasized that “[n]ot every offhand comment indicating racial bias or 
hostility will justify” such an inquiry.  Instead, the court must find that 
statements must show that racial animus was “a significant motivating 
factor” in the juror’s vote.87 Again, the discussion of the larger impact of 
racial bias during jury trials is the focus here.  The Court highlighted that 
larger harm, where: “Permitting racial prejudice in the jury system damages 
both the fact and the perception of the jury’s role as a vital check against the 
wrongful exercise of power by the State.”88 Thus, the Court highlighted, citing 
its 1979 ruling in Rose v. Mitchell, that race discrimination, while “odious in 
all aspects, is especially pernicious in the administration of justice.”89   
But a remedy is not important because of the need to ensure fairness 
to the particular defendant.  Rather, the Court emphasized that the “fact and 
the perception” of the jury’s unbiased role is critical to the legitimacy of the 
criminal justice system as a whole, the Justice emphasized.90  That reasoning 
is very much aligned with the argument highlighted here: imposing serious 
remedies for intentional discrimination, such as doing over an entire criminal 
trial, is needed to safeguard the legitimacy of the entire system. 
 
5.  Dormant Commerce Clause and Purpose 
The Supreme Court’s doctrine in the Dormant Commerce Clause 
setting has also increasingly emphasized a purpose-based view that an intent 
to engage in protectionism and favor local commerce violates the Clause.91  
Regulation of commerce is acceptable if it is based on “legitimate” regulatory 
considerations and there are not reasonable non-discriminatory means to 
carry out those goals.92  As in other areas, the courts may not be able to 
define the array of legitimate regulatory actions that government can take.  
The Court bars facial discrimination, where a local measure distinguishes 
between local and interstate commerce in its text, as well as regulation that 
is “clearly excessive” in its burden on non-local commerce, under the Pike 
test.93  Increasingly, the Court has emphasized intent to discriminate, or 
“protectionist animus.”94  The Court has declined to strike down regulations 
                                                
87 Id. 
88 Id. at 868 (citing Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 411 (1991).  
89 Id. (quoting Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 555, (1979)).  
90 Id. 
91 Daniel Francis, The Decline of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 94 DENV. L. REV. 255 
(2017).  
92 Dep’t of Revenue v. Davis, 553 U.S. 328, 338-39 (2008) (plurality opinion). 
93 Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, 455-56 (1992); Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 
137 (1970). 
94  Francis, supra, at 280. For an early and influential call for the courts to focus on 
purposeful discrimination, see Donald H. Regan, The Supreme Court and State 
Protectionism: Making Sense of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1091 
(1986). 
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for which there was “no discriminatory intent,” 95 or strike down legislation 
where the “avowed purpose” and the “motive behind it” is protectionism.96  
The caselaw is complex and has been criticized for sometimes inferring 
purpose from effect and sometimes not finding a protectionist purpose when a 
law favors local government on its face.97 Whether the doctrine is consistent 
or principled or sound is not my focus here; what is relevant is that the Court 
deems as a central constitutional evil intentional or purposeful 
discrimination by government, so much so that expression of it can disable 
government policymaking. 
 
6. Bad Faith Executive Action 
Cases regarding structural powers also reflect the concern with the 
legitimacy of government action.  In a set of cases regarding whether the 
Executive acted within the scope of the immigration power, or rather violated 
the due process or other constitutional rights of a person, the Court has asked 
whether the Government has a “facially legitimate and bona fide” reason for 
denying entry to the United States.  In so doing, the Court has examined 
whether the Government acted in “bad faith,” or with intent to 
unconstitutionally discriminate.98  If so, the Executive would arguably be 
acting outside of the discretion conveyed by the immigration power.  That 
illegitimate action may raise constitutional questions regarding the 
structural powers of government, is an argument that has not been 
sufficiently been developed in the caselaw and the constitutional law 
literature, and I develop it further in Part II. 
 
C. The Harm and the Cost of Discriminatory Intent 
As these constitutional doctrines convey, cost of discriminatory intent 
is not simply the harm to a plaintiff in a case.  Often the Justices recognize 
that the cost is broader and more structural than the harm to victims: it 
affects the reputation and legitimacy of government itself.  It may affect the 
perception that government is neutral with respect to religion, or that 
government is race-neutral in criminal trials, or that government is not 
discriminating in favor of local government.  The harm to individuals may be 
real and substantial, but the cost to the legitimacy of government is far 
greater than is often acknowledged in the literature. 
                                                
95 Bacchus Imports v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 272-73 (1984). 
96 W. Lynn Creamery v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 194, 196 (1994). 
97 Francis, supra, at 286-87, 292 (“Under the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts, in cases without 
evidence of a subjective intention to distort competition, the rule against discrimination has 
collapsed.”). 
98 Kerry v. Din, 135 S. Ct. 2128, 2139–41 (2015) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment); 
Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977).  
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Jeremy Waldron has developed this point in his book “The Harm in 
Hate Speech,” describing just how broad the cost can be in the context of hate 
speech, not by government, but by private individuals as well.  While 
Waldron’s argument does not necessarily implicate government legitimacy 
(and the concerns are far greater when it is the government itself that is 
engaging in what Waldron calls hate speech), Waldron sets out that a society 
that tolerates derogatory speech towards victims not only permits harm to 
victims, but also undermines the dignity and legitimacy of that society.99  
Waldron argues that a plural democracy has as a central public good that 
society is “for” everyone, and that members of all groups know that they will 
not face “hostility, violence, discrimination, or exclusion by others.”100  Speech 
that undermines that good creates a “slow-acting poison,” that undermines 
society.101  In turn, it creates more than just a harm to particular individuals 
who receive directly the hate speech, but it harms “basic social standing” as 
group members more broadly, which Waldron terms “dignity.”102  Added to 
Waldron’s concerns, where the government is the speaker, is the concern with 
the legitimacy of government itself.  To have the government itself making 
statements that encourage “hostility, violence, discrimination, or exclusion” 
creates yet another order of harm to the entire polity. 
Reva Siegel has described in the equal protection context, how in 
recent cases, a group of the Justice has been concerned with what she aptly 
terms the “balkanization” concern: a concern not just with racial 
classifications or subordinating minority groups, but rather the “social 
divisiveness” that would result from certain race-conscious remedies or 
practices.103   The anti-subordination principle in equal protection law focuses 
on harms that disproportionately affect members of marginalized groups.  As 
Siegel develops, some Justices are not comfortable remedying those harms, 
but nor with focusing more formally in a “colorblindness” approach only on 
whether race is used as a classification. Instead, they ask whether 
government practices would tend to “anticipate and endeavor to ameliorate 
race-conscious resentments.” 104  Such a view could adopt a sociological 
legitimacy approach and empirically examine whether inter-group friction 
results from a government practice. Instead, the Justices make their own 
judgments about what practices seem likely to aggravate tension.  They are 
attentive to the “appearance” that government action takes and what 
consequences can flow from that.105 Thus, Siegel describes how in Parents 
                                                
99 Jeremy Waldron, The Harm in Hate Speech (2012).  
100 Id. at 4. 
101 Id. 
102 Id. at 5. 
103 Reva B. Siegel, From Colorblindness to Antibalkanization: An Emerging Group of Decision 
in Race Quality Cases, 120 YALE L. J. 1278 (2011). 
104 Id. at  1300. 
105 Id. at  1300. 
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Involved, Justice Anthony Kennedy described how race-reassignment plans 
in public schools, if handled without care, “can lead to corrosive discourse, 
where race serves not as an element of our diverse heritage but instead as a 
bargaining chip in the political process.”106    
Such rulings reflect a concern with social divisiveness that extends 
beyond situations in which there is a showing of unconstitutional intent.  
However, the balkanization approach in such cases, that Siegel importantly 
brings out, helps us to understand the caselaw and the focus on the broad 
legitimacy-based consequences of discrimination discussed here. That some 
Justices are more broadly concerned with the problem of divisiveness helps to 
explain why they may be particularly concerned with it when intent to be 
divisive is manifest. The problem with balkanization, as well, can be 
explained as a problem of moral legitimacy, and a cost felt across society. The 
concern that Siegel raises is that the concern with the cost of divisiveness 
extends to all of society, including non-minority groups, and it can minimize 
remedies for harm directed to minority groups. There can be tension between 
the legitimacy-focused approach, advanced here, and an anti-subordination 
focus.  For these purposes, I just want to underscore that each of the types of 
harms, to the individual, to the group, to society, and then the cost to moral 
legitimacy of government, are broad and important.  It is the latter, the cost 
to legitimacy, however, that is not clearly set out in constitutional doctrine or 
in the scholarship explaining why discriminatory intent matters.  
 
D. Defining Intent   
Rather than take on the systematic scope of those harms to the 
individual, group, society, and then the cost to government, scholars have 
tended to focus more narrowly on constitutional doctrine as set out by the 
Supreme Court.  In response to the caselaw just described, some scholars 
have also taken the various ways in which intent can be constitutionally 
impermissible to mean that the doctrine is inconsistent.  After all, the 
Supreme Court adopts different formulations of what suffices to prove intent, 
and even different notions of what consists in intent.  Richard Fallon has 
argued that the doctrine is in some disarray in a recent article that carefully 
canvases doctrines regarding legislative intent across a range of 
constitutional contexts.107  My focus is not on how intent is defined or proved; 
my focus is on moral legitimacy and not on the legal legitimacy of existing 
doctrine.  However, the doctrine is more coherent, I will argue, than some 
maintain, if one turns from those difficult evidentiary questions.  Different 
words are used by the Court to express standards in different areas.  While 
putting to one side what level of proof or what definition of intent courts do or 
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should adopt, I argue that the fundamental underlying problem of cost to 
legitimacy remain quite similar across a range of constitutional doctrines. 
To expand on the argument that evidentiary problems make 
discriminatory intent doctrines poor sources for doctrine, Richard Fallon has 
recently argued that “some conceptions of forbidden legislative intent purport 
to be objective, not subjective, due to their exclusive focus on publicly 
observable conditions--such as statutes' facial discrimination against racial or 
religious minorities.” 108  Such objective conceptions are suitable, but Fallon 
argues that since they focus “solely on statutes’ facial content or publicly 
measurable effects” then the reference to intent “does no real analytical 
work.” 109 As described, the Court does not always (or even typically) refer to 
actual intent, in the subjective sense, of lawmakers. Fallon argues that “we 
should reconceptualize doctrines that ascribe forbidden intentions exclusively 
on the basis of specified statutory content or effects as substantive doctrines 
that prescribe results directly on the basis of that content or those effects.”110  
In my view, that is what we largely already have in the doctrine.  
Specifically, the breed of content prescribed are illegitimate actions based on 
discrimination.  When the government acts with the purpose or intent to 
discriminate, it is acting in a substantively unauthorized way.   
The terminology used to express a constitutional intent claim may get 
in the way and explain the seeming use of subjective and not objective 
criteria for ascertaining intent.  For example, animus is the term that many 
constitutional litigators and scholars use to label claims that forbidden intent 
motivated government actors, although in other contexts the term used is 
“purpose” and in others, “intent.”  Take for example, an amicus brief of 
constitutional law scholars in the litigation surrounding the immigration-
related Executive Orders issued in 2017.  Amici argue: “The extraordinary 
record in this case demonstrates that President Trump's principal motive in 
issuing the Order was anti-Islamic animus.”111  Those scholars are speaking 
of an order “not explicitly denominated a ‘Muslim Ban,’” but which had the 
effect of doing so as its “true purpose,” they argued, based on the President’s 
“animus-laded campaign promise,” and not for “any constitutionally 
legitimate reason.”   
Those arguments have a great deal packed into them. On one level, it 
is odd that they would use the term “animus,” when animus has often been 
used to refer to claim in which there is only rational basis review under the 
Equal Protection Clause.  If there is strict scrutiny, because a suspect 
characteristic (like race or like religion) is implicated, then the doctrine 
                                                
108 Fallon, supra note xxx, at 529. 
109 Id. at 529. 
110 Id. at 529. 
111  Motion for Leave to File Amicus Brief in Three Related Proceedings and Brief of 
Constitutional Law Scholars as Amici Curiae Opposing the Government's Application for 
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supports using the term “purpose” or “intent.”  However, the claims in that 
case relate to both the First and Fourteenth Amendments.  In the First 
Amendment Establishment Clause context, the Justices have forbidden the 
government from acting with “animus” towards any particular religion.112  
The Court has said that it is wrong for the government to “signal disfavor” 
towards a religious group or to “denigrate” a religious group.113   
Purpose, rather than the word animus, is the concept typically used in 
Establishment Clause cases.  The Court has described the central concern as 
“an official purpose to disapprove of a particular religion or of religion in 
general,” 114  or under the Lemon test, conversely described as the 
Government’s burden to show that an action has “a secular legislative 
purpose.”115 Just as purpose or intent is the overarching concept used in the 
Equal Protection Clause cases, purpose is emphasized in the First 
Amendment context.  Animus may be a way of sometimes characterizing 
government intent,116 but it is not the way the Court typically refers to the 
overarching standard. 
Returning to the Equal Protection Clause, even in the types of cases 
that animus is particularly used to refer to, rational basis cases that 
nevertheless result in relief for plaintiffs, the Court does not often use the 
term “animus” to explain the result.  In the seminal cases in that line of cases 
that are sometimes referred to in shorthand as animus cases, in United 
States Department of Agriculture v Moreno, the Court put it this way: 
 
For if the constitutional conception of ‘equal protection of the laws’ 
means anything, it must at the very least mean that a bare 
congressional desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot 
constitute a legitimate governmental interest.117 
 
Relying on the same language, in City of Cleburne v Cleburne Living Center, 
the Justices reiterated that “some objectives--such as ‘a bare ... desire to 
harm a politically unpopular group'-- are not legitimate state interests.”118 A 
                                                
112  See, e.g., Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811, 1822 (2014); id. at 1831 (Alito, J., 
concurring); Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Vill. Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 722, 728 
(1994) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment); Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 244 
(1982); see also Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 532 
(1993). 
113  Town of Greece, 134 S.Ct. at 1824, 1826. 
114 See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 532 (1993). 
115 Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612–13 (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm’n of the City of New York, 397 
U.S. 664, 674 (1970)). 
116 Hernandez v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 490 U.S. 680, 696 (1989) (finding challenged 
law survived Lemon test’s purpose prong where “there is no allegation that [it] was born of 
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117 413 US 528, 533 (1973).   
118 473 US 432 (1985). 
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case that does use the term “animus” is Romer v. Evans.  In Romer, the Court 
explained that “imposing a broad and undifferentiated disability on a single 
named group” was “inexplicable by anything but animus toward the class it 
affects.”119  
 Thus, the definition of animus or intent or purpose is important, but it 
often does not explain the reasoning or results of decisions.  Often 
discriminatory intent is largely proved by the absence of what may matter 
more: a legitimate basis for government decisionmaking.  Take for example, 
recent rulings in which the Court has not relied on the term “animus” (and 
for good reason, I argue here).  In Windsor, the Court explained that “a bare 
congressional desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot’ justify 
disparate treatment of that group.” 120   This was an intentional choice.  
Justice Kennedy was referring to language in cases like Moreno in which 
lawmakers targeted a group with little or no justification, raising the concern 
that they were intentionally trying to harm the group.  The focus is as much 
on the legitimacy of the government action as on the “intent” of the 
lawmakers.  In other more recent opinions, Justice Kennedy has stepped 
away from any implication that animus involves an intentional and conscious 
hatred of the target group.  Justice Kennedy has written: 
 
“Prejudice, we are beginning to understand, rises not from malice or 
hostile animus alone. It may result as well from insensitivity caused by 
simple want of careful, rational reflection or from some instinctive 
mechanism to guard against people who appear to be different in some 
respects from ourselves.”121  
 
Justice Kennedy’s ruling in Obergefell v. Hodges similarly emphasized that 
denial to same-sex couples of the right to marry expressed “disapproval of 
their relationships” and “serves to disrespect and subordinate them.”122 That 
ruling employs a public reason approach in that it emphasizes that one group 
was not treating fellow citizens as equals with regard to marriage.123 
Similarly, in religious discrimination cases, the Court has 
acknowledged that officials might not “understand” or “failed to perceive” the 
                                                
119 Romer v Evans, 517 US 620, 632 (1996). 
120 United States v Windsor, 133 S Ct 2675, 2694 (2013) 
121  Bd. of Trustees of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett,531 U.S. 356, 374 (2001) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring). 
122 135 S.Ct. 2584, 2604 (2015).  For discussion of the role of public reason in the decision, 
see, e.g. Robert Katz, The Role of Public Reason in Obergefell v. Hodges, 11 FIU L. REV. 177 
(2015). 
123 For a discussion of the language on Obergefell that disparages non-marital relationships 
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bias.124  Or the Justices have discussed the harm arising from “unconscious 
prejudices and disguised animus,” as well as the social harms of “covert and 
illicit stereotyping.”125   
The term animus could be taken to imply action or words dripping 
with hatred.  However, as the discussion above suggests, the term does not 
mean that actors possessed subjective motivation, necessarily, as it is used in 
cases.  “Animus” can refer to situations in which the justifications for 
targeting a group are extremely weak and there is no overt evidence of 
subjective intent to harm a group.  Instead, the desire to harm is inferred 
from the circumstances and the nature of the government act. The precise 
role that animus plays, as opposed to a claim that discrimination is 
purposeful, is still unclear in the doctrine. Dale Carpenter writes that “the 
constitutional anti-animus principle remains an unappreciated one. There is 
little consensus about what animus is; about whether, why, and when it is 
constitutionally problematic; or about what the appropriate role of courts, if 
any, should be in policing it.”126  One reason that the role animus plays is less 
clear is that it is used in cases in which intent of government actors plays a 
role, but the scrutiny is not strict.127  Animus, or intentional discrimination, 
plays a role in the result in such cases, but so does the government’s lack of 
justification for its action against a group.  As discussed in the next Part, the 
more general relationship between the intent evidence and the government’s 
justifications, or lack thereof, is a better place to look to explain the doctrine. 
 
E. From Harm to Cost 
I have argued that the focus of discriminatory intent doctrine should 
not be on the harm to victims.   Such harm can be great and it should not be 
trivialized, but even if such harm is hard to identify, the problem remains 
great. Instead, I argue, the focus should be on the larger cost to society.  That 
cost is systematic and it is structural.  Government discrimination does not 
just create divisiveness that impacts society broadly, as in a balkanization 
theory, but also impacting the legitimacy of government itself.  In the areas 
                                                
124 Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 524. 
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126 Dale Carpenter, Windsor Products: Equal Protection From Animus, 2013 Sup. Ct. Rev. 
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of caselaw described above, the Court often acknowledges the severity and 
the scope of the cost.  Thus, having a racist juror sitting in a criminal trial 
does not just implicate a single criminal conviction, but it calls into question 
the legitimacy of the criminal justice system.  Religious discrimination does 
not just harm believers, but it comes at a cost to the state’s neutrality in 
general on religious matters.   
It must also be emphasized that even more narrowly drafted judicial 
rulings can have more sweeping implications on closer examination.  In 
Lawrence v. Texas, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor stated, “moral disapproval 
of a group cannot be a legitimate government interest,” and then explained 
the wide range of legal consequences that criminal sodomy laws imposed.128  
Even if the laws were rarely enforced, they did more than just state moral 
disapproval, as serious as that was, but the laws resulted in “discrimination 
against homosexuals as a class in an array of areas outside the criminal 
law.”129  The law permitted a case system in which an entire group faced 
systematic legal disadvantages, in addition to the moral condemnation 
implied by the law.  Those broad and systemic consequences, both legal and 
social, of discrimination, explain why it is taken so seriously in constitutional 
doctrine, but they also explain why narrower theories of the harm of 
discrimination do not fully capture the degree of the problem.   
In some areas, however, the Supreme Court has required a showing 
that “purposeful discrimination had a discriminatory effect” on a particular 
plaintiff.130  In stating that, in the case of McCleskey v. Kemp, the Justices 
explained that to show this, the defendant would have to show that there was 
discrimination in his criminal case.131  That requirement is not consistent 
with the type of harm that purposeful discrimination, if shown, would cause.  
The Court, in fact, often permits relief based on racial classifications or 
group-based discrimination even if one cannot show that one’s case was 
definitely affected; the Sixth Amendment cases just discussed in which a 
juror was affected by racial bias, but one cannot say to what degree it 
impacted the decision to convict, are an example in the criminal law setting.  
The concept of discriminatory intent as one that impact legitimacy of 
government, broadly, should call into question doctrines requiring heightened 
standing or causation for a plaintiff to bring a case.  That language in 
McCleskey is inconsistent with what the Court required in cases before and 
since, but it is also deeply inconsistent, I would argue, with the deeper 
purpose of having intent tests. 
A different theory of discriminatory intent’s role in the doctrine is that 
such expressions themselves harm individuals and should be forbidden for 
that reason.  That view of equal protection law, and constitutional harm more 
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generally, supports the concept that judges should attend to statements made 
by government actors and the messages sent by government acts.  Such an 
expressive theory in a sense would address the concern that the Court in a 
ruling like McCleskey conceives of the harm of race discrimination too 
narrowly.  However, expressive harm theories in their own way narrow the 
focus to the harm that such statements cause to victims.  Thus, in 
Establishment Clause cases, Court has suggested: “Endorsement sends a 
message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the 
political community, and an accompanying message to adherents that they 
are insiders, favored members of the political community. Disapproval sends 
the opposite message.”132  In voting discrimination cases, the Justices have 
described the harms as “expressive harms.” 133   Such statements in the 
doctrine support the notion that expressive harm matters in constitutional 
law.  Constitutional theorists argue that expressive harm should in fact be a 
focus of certain constitutional inquiries.134 
In this Article, I argue that while valuable, theories of expressive harm 
as insufficient to fully capture the full cost of discrimination. Indeed, 
antisubordination theories focusing more broadly on harm to minority 
groups, do not share quite as wide a lens as this legitimacy approach. 
Instead, my focus is not on harm, but the cost to legitimacy of government.  A 
different view of the expressive dimension of discrimination, not focused on 
harm, has been developed by Deborah Hellman.135  On Hellman’s view, a law 
or policy can be assessed and may constitute unconstitutional discrimination 
based on message conveyed or its meaning rather than based on expressive or 
other harm.  That view is highly compatible with the legitimacy-focused 
approach I develop here. 
To be sure, the lines can blur between expressive harm to the affected 
individuals, and then the group, then extending to society, and then the cost 
in legitimacy to government.  Some of the statements above that support an 
expressive harm theory also support the concern that sending a message of 
disparagement is something that the government should not do.  Justice 
Kennedy referred to the “danger of stigma and stirred animosities,” if 
                                                
132 Lynch, 465 U.S. at 687, 688 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
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religious line-drawing occurs.136  There, the focus extends beyond the target 
group to all affected by the inter-religious harm that results.  Such broadly 
conceived harms can be viewed as societal.  The line between a harm to 
everyone in society and a cost that also undermines the legitimacy of 
government can be fine indeed.  It may make sense for judges not to bother 
trying to draw such fine lines.  Harms that extend so broadly as create a cost 
to much of society will also damage government legitimacy so greatly that the 
constitutional problem deserves a substantial remedy whether due to harm to 
victims, or the cost to government legitimacy, or both. 
 
II.  THE EFFECTS OF DISCRIMINATORY INTENT ON LEGITIMACY 
 
In Part I, I have argued that the harm of discriminatory intent should 
not be the focus.  Instead, the focus should be on the larger costs, where 
discrimination affects the very structure and moral legitimacy of government.  
I have argued that a rule that explicitly focuses on the legitimacy of 
government action both explains much of current doctrine and can improve 
upon it.  Such a rule makes clearer what work claims of unconstitutional 
intent do and what the stakes are.   
Take one possible and often-advanced explanation of why intent 
matters: that it provides evidence that what the government is really doing is 
in fact discriminatory.  However, if the goal is to assess what consists in 
discrimination, other tools in addition to intent might serve that goal equally 
well.  For example, if the goal is to remedy disparate outcomes, then there 
would be no need to rely on intent as a proxy.  One could focus primarily on 
the disparate outcomes themselves.  On a theory of sociological legitimacy, 
perhaps that would sensibly be the focus.  From that perspective, scholars 
have criticized intent doctrine as misleading and not asking the right 
questions or permitting the right remedies.  I agree and I have often argued 
that such an empirical perspective is highly valuable in constitutional law 
generally.  However, one place it which it does not capture the appropriate 
harm is in this area of disparagement and discriminatory intent, where the 
harm to moral legitimacy is extremely hard to quantify and measure. 
Many have criticized intent doctrines generally, where “it is altogether 
possible for a law which is the expression of a bad motive to be a good law.”137  
Or, as John Hart Ely has put it, the Constitution should not be “an 
instrument for punishing the evil thoughts of members of the political 
branches by knocking down handiwork of theirs which under other 
circumstances would count as legitimate.”138  Ely suggested it would be even 
worse to reframe the inquiry into motivation as one into “purpose,” which is 
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precisely how the Supreme Court proceeded to reframe the inquiry in a series 
of constitutional contexts.139  However, Ely concluded that legislation is not 
legitimate if its motivation is to disadvantage minority groups.140  Why might 
that be, even if one is skeptical of relying on intent or purpose in 
constitutional doctrine generally?  In the end, Ely seems comfortable with 
intent doctrines if limited to areas in which disadvantaged minority groups 
are the target of government action that harms them. 
A second explanation for why one would have intent doctrines is that 
intent itself constitutes a harm that has the effect of denigrating targeted 
individuals.  Such expressive harms, or subordinating messages, could 
themselves be the problem.  As discussed in Part I.D, I reject that view as too 
narrow and insufficient to capture the full harm of discriminatory intent.   
A third explanation is that for the government to openly rely on 
discriminatory criteria in its decisionmaking has a structural cost.  Such 
action makes government actors less worthy of trust and illegitimate.  That 
third explanation is the one that I focus on in this Article.  
In this Part, I focus on the effects of a showing of discriminatory intent 
and the costs and benefits to government.  First, I develop how evidence 
discriminatory intent can undermine government defenses to a constitutional 
claim.  Second, I develop how a legitimacy-based approach towards 
discriminatory intent incentivizes neutral and non-discriminatory 
government action.  Third, I argue that evidence of ill intent can help with an 
argument that the government has exceeded the bounds of its structural 
power to act.  Illegitimacy can thus taint the government and affect its ability 
to act or defend its actions.  It does not always have the structure of a 
plaintiff trying to “prove” intent.  Some acts are so corrosive that they may 
undermine the government’s ability to act.  Those consequences will be 
further developed in Part III. 
 
A.  Undermining Government Defenses 
In each of the constitutional contexts discussed, evidence of bad 
purpose, intent or faith can serve not just to buttress a claim of 
discrimination, but also to undermine government defenses to a 
constitutional claim.  Thus, it need not be just an element of expressive harm 
that plaintiffs suffer and it does not necessarily just define the plaintiff’s 
required showing of purpose or intent.  Instead, evidence of intent (sometimes 
including evidence of a prima facie case or evidence of disparate impact) can 
sometimes shift the burden to the Government to explain itself.  This is the 
standard approach for statutory discrimination claims under Title VII.   
The focus here is not on evidentiary burdens for assessing claims of 
discrimination, but rather the purpose of forcing the Government to do more 
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if there is evidence of intentional discrimination.  That purpose is not just 
evidentiary.  There is a different goal: to repair the legitimacy of Government 
that is damaged by expressed intentional discrimination.  It is itself a good 
thing to incentivize government actors to adopt neutral and non-group-based 
reasons for their actions. If it is a burden of government to show that its 
actions are legitimate and not based on corrosive desire to harm groups, 
whether defined objectively or subjectively or both, then the structure of the 
claim itself gives the government a chance to redeem its legitimacy.  That 
also helps to explain why in so many areas, the doctrine involves objective 
and not just subjective analysis.  The Government may simply seek to 
counter that officials acted with subjective discriminatory intent, but in 
offering a neutral ground for its action and evidence to support that neutral 
ground, the Government may commonly rely upon objective evidence, such as 
statements made in support of the action, the practical effects of the action, 
the pattern of its enforcement, and its likely beneficiaries.   
The Establishment Clause context provides a good illustration of this 
in operation, perhaps in part because the focus has long been not just on the 
preference given to a religious group but on the cost to Government to be 
playing any role in matters of religion at all.  Thus, in the Establishment 
Clause context, the Court has said that in examining whether the “primary 
purpose” of an act is secular, the approach seeks to ascertain the “official 
objective . . . from readily discoverable fact, without any judicial 
psychoanalysis of a drafter’s heart of hearts.”141  The Court is an “objective 
observer.”142  The approach analyzes “external signs” such as “text, legislative 
history, and implementation” of the official act. 143  The “specific sequence of 
events” leading to the official action is considered.144  Nor is such an inquiry 
limited to just the final decisionmakers in a government process.145  The 
Supreme Court has explained that: “[w]hen there is [] proof that a 
discriminatory purpose has been a motivating factor in the decision,” a court 
may consider “contemporary statements by members of the decisionmaking 
body.”146  In so doing, courts often find no evidence of discriminatory purpose.  
In its Town of Greece ruling, the Court held that “[i]n no instance did town 
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leaders signal disfavor toward nonparticipants or suggest that their stature 
in the community was in any way diminished.”147  That interpretation of the 
town’s legislative prayer policy is not uncontroversial, and higher-courts may 
not always be best situated to assess a factual record to make these 
determinations. 
To take another prominent and recent example of a legitimacy-based 
approach, consider the ruling of the Supreme Court in United States v. 
Windsor.  There the Court held that “no legitimate purpose overcomes the 
purpose and effect to disparage and to injure those whom the State, by its 
marriage laws, sought to protect in personhood and dignity.”148 That ruling 
nicely brings to the fore a sharp debate over whether this approach is the 
right one.  In dissent, Justice Antonin Scalia agreed, except as to the evidence 
demanded.  “Laying such a charge against them,” he declared, “should 
require the most extraordinary evidence.”149  Yet “extraordinary evidence” 
has never been required in such cases; if expressed intent to discriminate is 
seriously harmful to government and is of grave concern, one may not shy 
away from taking action based on good evidence of such intent, rather than 
“extraordinary” evidence.  What is highly relevant about the interchange in 
Windsor, though, is that the focus is on the speaker, what must be shown 
about that speaker, and not on the degree of harm to the victims.   
The Supreme Court’s ruling in United States v. Windsor has puzzled 
some commentators who, like Justice Scalia and Chief Justice Roberts in 
their dissents, were skeptical that the plaintiffs had sufficient evidence for 
the claim that the Defense of Marriage Act lacked any “legitimate purpose 
overcomes the purpose and effect to disparage and to injure.”150  Prof. Brian 
Soucek, for example, asks why the majority “needed to place so much 
emphasis on animus” in its opinion, if the DOMA served no legitimate federal 
interests.151  I view Windsor differently.  For the majority, the question was 
whether Congress had intended to limit state marriage regulation, and not 
whether the intent was to harm same-sex couples.  As a result, the Court 
relied on “strong evidence” that “the congressional purpose [was] to influence 
or interfere with state sovereign choices about who may be married.”152  The 
Court emphasized the “history of DOMA’s enactment and its own text,” in its 
analysis, including statements that the statute was intended to express 
“moral disapproval of homosexuality.”153    
                                                
147 Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811, 1826 (2014). 
148 U.S. v. Windsor, 133 S.Ct. 2675, 2696 (2013).   
149 Id at 2707 (Scalia, J, dissenting).   
150 U.S. v. Windsor, 133 S.Ct. 2675, 2696 (2013).   
151 Brian Soucek, The Return of Noncongruent Equal Protection, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 155, 
170 (2014).  
152 United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2693 (2013). 
153 Id. at 2693. 
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The Windsor Court, in my view, did not focus on the harm to victims, 
but rather emphasized the illegitimacy of federal action.  The majority did 
not carefully describe the “arguments put forward” by DOMA’s defenders, as 
Justice Scalia emphasized in his dissent, while instead noting the very title of 
the statute and its operation sought to deprive individuals of rights based on 
group membership.  More troubling to Justice Scalia, the majority did not 
state whether the claim at issue was an equal protection claim or a due 
process claim. 154   But if illegitimate discriminatory intent made any 
supposedly neutral justifications unsupported, then Congress did not 
legitimately legislate in the first place, under either constitutional theory.  As 
a result, the standard of review for the plaintiff’s claim was less important 
than the Government’s lack of a credible defense.   
Thus, the Windsor majority concluded its opinion stating that both the 
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments “withdraw[]” from the Government “the 
power to degrade or demean” individuals.155  That last statement captures 
well the legitimacy-based approach advanced here.  Whether it is conceived 
as an external constraint imposed by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, 
or as a lack of internal government power, the result is that the government 
simply lacks the power to act out of an intent to discriminate against groups.   
 
B.  Promoting Nondiscriminatory Government 
The impact of a finding if intentional discrimination can be to declare 
Government action illegitimate and beyond the power of Government to act 
in the first place.  As described in Part I, the degree and type of proof of 
intent required to show that the Government has been sufficiently 
delegitimized by intentional discrimination may depend on the claim 
involved.  What is clear, though, putting to one side questions regarding how 
to prove discriminatory intent, is that it matters in this analysis for the 
government to make a neutral statement of the purpose of its action.  Many 
have criticized this feature of intent doctrines for sound reasons.156  Such 
intent doctrines can encourage benign window-dressing or insincere 
                                                
154 Id. at 2706-7 (Scalia, J. dissenting).  
155 Id. at 2695.  
156  See, e.g. Joel W. Friedman, The Burger Court and the Prima Facie Case in 
Employment Discrimination Litigation: A Critique, 65 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 13 (1979) 
(arguing that “discrimination can result from a combination of neutral policies and a 
tradition of societally imposed inequity.”); David A. Stephen, True Lies: The Role of Pretext 
Evidence Under Batson v. Kentucky in the Wake of St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 94 
MICH. L. REV. 488 (1995); Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 773 (Stevens, J. dissenting) 
(arguing that the race-neutral explanation doctrine adopted by the majority made the 
doctrine a “meaningless charade,” where a prosecutor can readily offer “’neutral 
explanations’ which bear facial legitimacy but conceal a discriminatory motive.”). 
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statements of non-discrimination that disguise very real discrimination.157  
Indeed, the Supreme Court has noted in some contexts that such neutral 
reasons need not be “persuasive, or even plausible,” since they are only 
serving the goal of assuring some facial validity of the government action, 
and will be tested only when the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to show 
that the reason offered was pretextual and that the government’s motive was 
to discriminate. 158   Having offered some stated neutral purpose for 
government action, it make take egregiously disparate patterns of 
enforcement, like in Yick Wo, to provide plaintiffs with a winning claim. 
There is an under-appreciated benefit to the weight that doctrine 
places on the presumption that the Government does not act with 
discriminatory intent when Government states it acts with non-
discriminatory intent or offers a facially valid reason for its actions.  To be 
sure, it can encourage not even plausible reasons.  However, the benefit is 
this: if one of the goals of constitutional doctrine is to strongly discourage the 
government from making intentionally discriminatory claims that disparage 
groups, then that presumption is a useful one.  It gives government actors 
strong incentives not to act in a disparaging way. It gives government actors 
reasons to frame their conduct in non-disparaging ways.  While those 
statements may not always be plausible, and while they may be mere window 
dressing in some settings, to encourage neutral and non-discriminatory 
window dressing does serve and important function. 
Indeed, that presumption may be at work in a range of government 
policies and rules of conduct.  For example, many government bodies have 
policies regulating what employees can say on social media, to try to avoid 
the corrosive impact it would have if a firefighter or police officer or other city 
official made derogatory statements.  The New York City Police Department, 
for example, has adopted highly restrictive rules.159  Intent doctrine has that 
effect of encouraging government to constrain and try to prevent such 
discriminatory statements in its actions and its policymaking. 
                                                
157 For a discussion in the context of race discrimination in jury-selection claims, see, e.g. 
Charles J. Ogletree, Just Say No!: A Proposal to Eliminate Racially Discriminatory Uses of 
Peremptory Challenges, 31 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1099, 1124-25 (1994).  For a detailed 
discussion of this problem in the context of employment discrimination cases, see Sheila R. 
Foster, Causation in Antidiscrimination Law: Beyond Intent Versus Impact, 41 HOUS. L. 
REV. 1469, 1515-16 (2005). 
158 See, e.g. Purkett v. Elem, 514 S. Ct. 765, 767 (1995).  See also Reeves v. Sanderson 
Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 143 (2000) (describing analysis in which plaintiff must 
show that the employer’s “proffered explanation” is pretext and that the motive was race 
discrimination, in an employment discrimination case); See St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 
509 U.S. 502 (1993) (same); Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 239 (2005) (explaining analysis 
in context of jury selection). 
159 Police Dept. Sets Rules for Officers' Use of Social Media, The New York Times, March 28, 
2013, at www.nytimes.com/2013/03/29/nyregion/new-york-police-dept-issues-guidelines-for-
social-media.html. 
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The presumption of non-intent is not always easy to overcome, to be 
sure. It is a presumption, after all.  The Supreme Court has explained that 
“[T]he Court often . . . accept[s] governmental statements of purpose, in 
keeping with the respect owed in the first instance to such official claims.”160 
Similarly, the Supreme Court cited in Palmer v. Thompson to an evidentiary 
concern making it “extremely difficult” to look outside official statements, in 
the context of legislative decisions by multi-member bodies.161  In that case, 
the Justices accepted a factual finding by the lower court of a purpose to not 
covertly operate segregated pools, but to shut down pools due to “avoid 
violence and economic loss.” 162  Since then the Court has been quite clear 
that evidence of discriminatory intent is not too “difficult or impossible” to 
assess, but is in fact a required aspect of the inquiry, in Fourteenth 
Amendment cases, and in other cases, such as First Amendment and Sixth 
Amendment cases.  Palmer is a troubling case.  But it was a case in which the 
Justices concluded the factual findings were mixed (and if the fact-finding 
was incorrect, the Supreme Court did not revisit the facts). 
In other rulings, the Supreme Court has understandably highlighted 
opposing evidentiary concerns.  People do not normally admit their 
motivation by unconstitutional bias and that “smoking gun” evidence does 
not always exist.  In its Sixth Amendment ruling in Pena-Rodriguez, the 
Court described an evidentiary concern with racially derogatory remarks.  
The Court explained how: “[t]he stigma that attends racial bias may make it 
difficult for a juror to report inappropriate statements during the course of 
juror deliberations.” 163  This important evidentiary concern makes it all the 
more important to remedy such explicit statements of discriminatory intent 
when they do come to light. 
To provide another example in recent and high-profile litigation, in the 
Ninth Circuit ruling in the Travel Ban litigation, Judge Kozinski dissented, 
arguing that proving intent to discriminate involves “hopeless[]” weighing of 
“imponderables” and constitutes “precisely the kind of ‘judicial 
psychoanalysis’ that the Supreme Court has told us to avoid. 164   Judge 
Kozinski was right that the Court presumes that the Government acts with 
non-discriminatory intent.  Judge Kozinski emphasized the Supreme Court 
noted in Hamdan that it has not “deferred to comments made by 
[government] officials to the media” when evaluating executive action, but 
that ruling did not address any claim of discriminatory intent.165 Similarly, 
Judge Kozinski emphasized the “presumption of regularity” that attaches to 
                                                
160 McCreary, 545 U.S. at 865. 
161 Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 224 (1971).  
162 Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).  
163 Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S.Ct. 855, 867 (2017). 
164 Washington v. Trump, 858 F.3d 1168 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting McCreary County v. ACLU 
of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 862 (2005)). 
165 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 623–24 n.52 (2006).  
UNCONSTITUTIONALLY ILLEGITIMATE DISCRIMINATION 
 
 
 
 
34 
federal officials’ actions.166  However, no such presumption attaches when 
there is evidence of discriminatory intent or purpose.  That is what the 
plaintiffs alleged in the Travel Ban litigation, making the presumption of 
regularity not as relevant.  It is a commonplace that evidence of 
discrimination can shift the burden to the government to explain why its 
action was not infected with a discriminatory purpose.  Indeed, as discussed 
next, in an important set of cases, evidence of discriminatory intent or 
purpose does more: it may deprive the government of the power to act at all. 
 
 C.  Undermining Government Power 
 
 In a range of areas in which Congress legislates and Executive actors 
enforce, the relevant power arises from structural principles or powers 
implied from the structure of the Constitution.  Courts have elaborated those 
powers, but they are not unlimited, including because other constitutional 
constraints may apply. The argument that I hope to advance here is that 
discriminatory intent doctrines do not just create individual rights, but they 
affect structural power as well.  The federal government may not be 
authorized to act within its structural power in a way that exhibits in 
constitutionally illegitimate intent.  Whether that is viewed as an external 
constraint on government power or an internal limit on that power, the result 
is that discriminatory intent can undermine government exercise of power. 
An important example is the immigration power.  There is no Article I 
federal immigration power; the “plenary” power of immigration matters was 
implied from a set of provisions by the Supreme Court in the late-Nineteenth 
Century.167  However, as the Supreme Court put it in Chadha, Congress and 
the Executive must “cho[ose] a constitutionally permissible means of 
implementing” their authority over immigration.168  That power is “subject to 
important constitutional limitations,” including due process and habeas 
corpus.169 In a set of cases, the Court has asked whether the Government has 
a “facially legitimate and bona fide” reason for denying entry to the United 
States.170  Courts will be unlikely to find the Government interest to be 
legitimate, however, if there is evidence that the Government acted with 
unconstitutionally illegitimate intent.  Another way to characterize the 
concern is that the Government is not properly acting with its power in such 
a case.  Rather than view evidence of ill intent as undermining a defense to a 
                                                
166 United States v. Chem. Found., Inc., 272 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1926).   
167 Boutilier v. INS, 387 U.S. 118, 123 (1967) (“Congress’ ‘plenary power to make rules for the 
admission of aliens and to exclude those who possess those characteristics which Congress 
has forbidden.’”). 
168 462 U.S. at 941. 
169 Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 695 (2001),. 
170 Kerry v. Din, 135 S. Ct. at 2139–40 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment); Fiallo v. 
Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977).  
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plaintiff’s claim, one can view the Government as having exceeded limits on 
its structural power.  On that view, legitimacy defines government power. 
The Supreme Court’s reasoning in Kerry v. Din is an amalgam of these 
types of approaches: the defense-undermining and the power-limiting.  In 
Din, in the controlling opinion regarding a challenge to denial of a visa, 
Justice Kennedy explained that where a plaintiff makes “an affirmative 
showing of bad faith” if it is “plausibly alleged with sufficient particularity,” 
courts may then ask whether it is “facially legitimate” in fact by looking 
“behind” the challenged denial.  Following Din, lower courts have similarly 
scrutinized government action in the immigration context where the plaintiff 
alleges racial bias.171   
The immigration-ban executive order litigation brought out the 
importance of this caselaw in ways that many had not appreciated before.  
Thus, the Fourth Circuit, in its ruling on the immigration-ban executive 
orders, held “Where plaintiffs have seriously called into question whether the 
stated reason for the challenged action was provided in good faith, … we step 
away from our deferential posture and look behind the stated reason for the 
challenged action.”  However, that panel noted, “We … have minimal 
guidance on what “look[ing] behind” a challenged immigration action entails,” 
since courts have not confronted the situation in which plaintiffs had alleged 
with particularity bad faith government at an executive-action level.  
Unfortunately, courts have now had to confront that issue squarely, and they 
may continue to do so in the future.  That said, in response to these rulings, 
the Administration rescinded, twice, its executive orders.  Statements that 
reflected religious and ethnic bias were retracted.   
Perhaps government do-overs, following findings of unconstitutional 
intent, can paper over individious intent.  They also have an important effect-
–the law of intentional discrimination encouraged the Government to re-do 
its actions in a more legitimate way.  That is a good thing.  When that should 
be enough to preserve the ability for Government to obtain a policymaking 
do-over, despite acting with expressed discriminatory intent, is the question 
to which I turn in the next Part. 
 
III.  REMEDYING THE EFFECT OF INTENT 
 
 This Part turns to the question what happens when the hammer drops: 
when a court finds unconstitutionally illegitimate discrimination, what are 
the consequences for government?  Can a court order a do-over, like in a 
criminal trial tainted by a racist juror?  If the same government officials 
respond to a court order finding a policy unconstitutional by re-enacting it, 
have they cured the taint, by simply disclaiming any discriminatory intent?  
When faced with discriminatory intent, courts have often dug in and imposed 
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searching and lasting remedies.  As in Hunter v. Underwood, the passage of 
time, even decades, may not be a barrier to relief.  However, the hypothetical 
posed in the Introduction raises the question whether the passage of time, 
combined with a re-enactment of a provision by new decisionmakers, is a 
barrier to relief.  On one view, judges should incentivize do-overs, to 
encourage policymakers to re-do policy without evidencing discriminatory 
intent.  However, I suggest that judges should still remain skeptical of 
certain do-overs, particularly because of the breadth of the harm that 
discriminatory intent has on society.  Courts may be reluctant to find 
discriminatory intent, and they may be quick to presume neutral motivations 
for government actors, but when that intent is found, I argue that demanding 
remedies should be imposed corresponding to the severity of the cost to the 
legitimacy of government. 
 
A.  Persistence of the Effect 
 
For how long does unconstitutionally illegitimate intent taint official 
action?  How long is the relevant action de-legitimized?  In general, the 
Supreme Court viewed the legacy of race segregation and other pervasive and 
intentional forms of discrimination as deep-rooted and requiring many years, 
indeed decades, to redress.  The desegregation decisions took many decades 
to implement.  Massive resistance resulted in countless types of government 
action struck down as an effort to evade race desegregation orders.  Thus, 
when the Arkansas legislature gave the Governor the power to close all 
schools in 1958-59, to prevent desegregation in Little Rock public schools, the 
federal courts struck that law down, and then an effort by the school board to 
transfer its schools to a private, segregated school, and a “freedom of choice” 
plan designed to maintain segregation.172 Over time, the Supreme Court 
limited the scope of remedies and reversed inter-district remedies where de 
jure violations were demonstrated in only one district, as well as limiting the 
scope and nature of remedies as findings of intentional discrimination 
receded.173  Whether that was appropriate raises the question whether the 
focus should be on the immediate persons harmed by the discrimination, or 
as I have argued, on the broader harm to groups, society, and government. 
That said, the Supreme Court has said arguably inconsistent things 
about this question of persistence of the taint of intentional discrimination.  
                                                
172 Aaron v. McKinley, 173 F.Supp. 944 (E.D. Ark. 1959); Aaron v. Cooper, 261 F.2d 97 (8th 
Cir. 1958); Clark v. Board of Educ., 426 F.2d 1035 (8th Cir. 1970); for a description of the 
history of this litigation and problems with compliance ongoing in the 1980s, see Little Rock 
School Dist. v. Pulaski County Special School Dist. No. 1, 738 F.2d 82 (8th Cir. 1984). 
173 For decisions affirming broad remedial powers, see Keyes v. School Dist., 413 U.S. 189, 
198-203 (1973) and Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 16-18 (1970); 
for decisions limiting those powers, see, e.g. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974); 
See Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70 (1995); Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467 (1992).  For an 
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In its 1971 ruling in Palmer v. Thompson, the Justices, faced with the 
different question whether to reocgonize a violation in the first place, said: 
 
[T]here is an element of futility in a judicial attempt to invalidate a 
law because of the bad motives of its supporters. If the law is struck 
down for this reason, rather than because of its facial content or effect, 
it would presumably be valid as soon as the legislature or relevant 
governing body repassed it for different reasons.174 
 
As noted, however, that ruling predated modern Equal Protection law in 
which purpose or intent is a central part of the inquiry.  Moreover, in Hunter 
v. Underwood, the Supreme Court held that the racially discriminatory effect 
persisted, though conditions had changed, for more than eighty years.175  Or 
as Justice Holmes has put it: “[I]t would be a new doctrine in constitutional 
law that the original invalidity could be cured by an administration which 
defeated their intent.”176 As amicus law professors put it in the Travel Ban 
case:  “Could a candidate run an explicitly racist campaign, win an election, 
enact facially neutral measures that distinctively injure the racial minority 
he had attacked for months, and then prevail against an equal protection 
challenge? Surely not.”177 
 Another way in which taint can dissipate is if conditions do change.  In 
Shelby County, the Court emphasized how new voting rights data was not 
supplied by Congress and that “current conditions” regarding race 
discrimination in voting were not as dire as those which Congress was 
responding to when enacting the Voting Rights Act in the 1960s.178  Whether 
that empirical case is right, or misplaced as the dissenters strongly 
emphasized in the case, the Court was taking a long view of the role that 
anti-discrimination legislation should play.  Unfortunately, the Justices 
vision that progress is largely complete and intentional discrimination a 
thing of the past may be naïve.  The reasoning in Shelby County supports the 
view that discriminatory taint may take years to redress. 
 
 B. Remedies for Discrimination 
  
 Constitutional standing and remedies is sometimes cabined based on 
the judicial conception of the scope of the injuries to particular plaintiffs.  
Doctrines of Article III standing include remedial limits that can be tailored 
to the particular harms suffered by particular plaintiffs.179  The focus in this 
                                                
174 Palmer v Thompson, 403 US 217 (1971). 
175 471 U.S. 222, 232 (1985). 
176 Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475, 487 (1903).   
177 Amicus brief, supra, at *20. 
178 Shelby County v. Holder, 133 S.Ct. 2612, 2631 (2013). 
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article on the larger cost to government legitimacy, suggests that some of 
those remedial limitations are not as well supported.  I have separately 
argued that Article III standing doctrine in fact reflects such a view, treating 
intentional discrimination claims differently because they involve group-
based harm and not individual harm.180  The theory advanced in this article 
helps to explain why and it suggests that standing might be based on still 
more than group-based harm, but also the broader cost to government 
legitimacy.  That theory of Article III injury-in-fact is beyond the scope of this 
Article. 181  The systemic or structural scope of the cost identified in this 
Article also suggests that not just Article III standing, but remedies should 
often be conceived as broader and longer-lasting than is sometimes the case.  
If the broader cost to government legitimacy persists, then remedies may be 
justified even if the harm directed at the particular plaintiffs is remedied.  
Then again, broader cost to government legitimacy may be less concrete and 
particularized than the types of injuries that the Court has emphasized in its 
Article III standing injuries.  If so, then there is a deep tension in 
constitutional doctrine between the costs identified as most fundamental, and 
the injuries that produce an Article III “Case and Controversy.” 
The above discussion is related to the question of how to remedy 
intentional discrimination when it is identified. John Hart Ely prominently 
made the argument that it is a good thing to encourage the Government to 
cure any constitutional invalidity.  Ely wrote: 
 
“[S]uppose from time to time an action previously invalidated for 
unconstitutional motivation is retaken and upheld: so what? We don't 
regard the system as having failed when a person whose conviction 
was reversed because the jury was biased is reconvicted by a jury on 
remand: indeed we regard it as vindicated.”182 
                                                
180 Brandon L. Garrett, Standing While Black: Distinguishing Lyons in Racial Profiling 
Cases, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1815 (2000). 
181 One question would be whether a case like Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984), in which 
the Supreme Court denied relief to plaintiffs seeking relief based on diminished ability of 
their children to receive an education in a racially integrated school, could instead proceed 
based on a theory not based on harm to education outcomes, but rather implicated 
government legitimacy to favor discriminatory private schools through tax treatment. 
Perhaps such a theory would be viewed unfavorably as a “generalized grievance,” and not of 
the type sufficiently concrete to satisfy Article III standing requirements.    See, e.g. Valley 
Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 
474 (1982) (finding lack of taxpayer standing); DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 
345–46 (2006). To the extent that any “generalized grievance” concern is prudential and 
viewed apart from the injury-in-fact requirement, then perhaps the theory advanced in this 
Article supports relaxing that prudential concern in situations involving discriminatory 
intent.  Craig Stern, Another Sign from Hein, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1169, 1214 (2008).  
Arguably, that is exactly what courts, including the Supreme Court, have done, including in 
voting rights cases involving discrimination claims.  Garrett, supra note 165. 
182 Ely, Democracy and Distrust, supra note xxx, at 139. 
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We allow and indeed require a trial do-over to “cure” error at a criminal trial.  
We regard the new trial as an independent event; one reason why is that 
there is a new jury and therefore an entirely fresh decisionmaker.   
The criminal law analogy is not on point when one is examining 
legislative or regulatory decisions.  If there is not just a single criminal trial 
to do-over, but rather a city council or Congress, or a Governor or President 
who must re-issue legislation or executive action or regulation or voting 
districts, then the stakes are higher and the decionmakers may be the same 
who reached the prior decision in an intentionally discriminatory manner.  
Absent a new slate of decisionmakers, there are concerns with incentivizing 
not very credible disavowals of previously shared discriminatory intent.  
Matthew Adler has argued that when one conceives the constitutional right 
as one relating to rules, then the court’s role is not to provide an optimal cure 
to a given plaintiff, but rather to “trigger the complete repeal” of an 
unconstitutional rule. 183   That remedy does not answer the question, 
however, of whether the do-over itself is enough. 
Moreover, the separate utility-based concern is raised that good and 
socially useful policy may have to be redone, to repair the cost to legitimacy 
caused by the discriminatory intent relevant actors.  A do-over can be very 
much worth the social cost imposed.  If an entirely new set of government 
actors, absent any of the biased former members, enacts a statute then 
perhaps the taint has been cured.  If the same decisionmakers act, however, 
the corrosive effect of discriminatory intent or purpose may be so great that 
the taint persists and disables their ability to easily make policy in that area.  
That may be a real cost.  Perhaps the cost of outright discriminatory 
statements by government is so great that the consequences must be severe.   
I have argued in this Article that courts should be open, and in many 
contexts they have been, to the view that broader cost to government 
legitimacy may justify disabling potentially good policy adopted with 
invidious motives.  In the long run, this strongly incentivizes non-
discriminatory policy and avoiding the need to interfere in policymaking. 
 
C.  Anti-Discrimination Statutes 
 
The problems described in this Article extend from constitutional 
settings to statutory settings.  In a range of statutory contexts, judges 
balance evidence of intentional discrimination as against the justifications 
offered by the government (or, more common in statutory contexts, a private 
employer).184  Thus, in Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing “additional evidence of 
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age-based animus” provided sufficient evidence for the jury to find that 
respondent had “intentionally discriminated” under the ADEA.185  Or in Price 
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor concurred, noting 
“direct evidence of discriminatory animus” played a role in the 
analysis.186 The Court did not use the term “animus,” but instead referred to 
how “remarks at work that are based on sex stereotypes do not inevitably 
prove that gender played a part in a particular employment decision.”187   
Far more broadly, the Supreme Court has held that anti-
discrimination statutes must be tailored to the scope of the targeted 
discrimination.  In Shelby County v. Holder, the Court held that the pre-
clearance requirements of Section 5 the Voting Rights Act were no longer 
constitutionally justified: “Our country has changed, and while any racial 
discrimination in voting is too much, Congress must ensure that the 
legislation it passes to remedy that problem speaks to current conditions.”188  
Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act forbids election laws with a racially 
discriminatory effect or that were enacted with discriminatory intent.189 A 
raft of voter ID laws enacted across the country have resulted in litigation 
across the country concerning discriminatory intent as well as impact.190  
For example, the Supreme Court in Cooper v. Holder affirmed a trial 
court ruling that a North Carolina law regarding districting was 
intentionally discriminatory based on race, citing to findings that this was a 
“textbook example” of race-based districting, where uncontested evidence 
showed that the district line-drawers established a target that the district in 
question should be “a majority black district.”191 The State had countered 
that it had tried to “pack” the district not with black voters, but with 
Democrats; this was a partisan and not a race-based gerrymander.192  The 
Court affirmed the trial judges’ ruling, but noted that it takes a “sensitive 
inquiry” into “circumstantial and direct evidence of intent.”193 
Another trial judge, perhaps, could have ruled differently, and 
accepted the State’s reason for drawing this voting district.  That raises the 
criticism, again, that a central problem for discriminatory intent doctrines is 
that government (or private defendants) have incentives to offer neutral and 
non-discriminatory reasons for their conduct.  Those reasons will be deferred 
                                                                                                                                            
460 U.S. 691, 700 (1983); e.g., NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. 26, 33 
(1967); NLRB v. Brown, 380 U.S., at 286-287. 
185 Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 153-54 (2000). 
186 490 U.S. 228, 271 (1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
187 Id. at 251. 
188 Shelby County v. Holder, 133 S.Ct. 2612, 2631 (2013). 
189  52 U.S.C. § 10301(a). 
190 Some voter identification-related laws have been struck down on discriminatory effects 
grounds.  See, e.g. Florida v. U.S., 2012 WL 3538298 *47. 
191 137 S. Ct. 1455, 1468-69 (2017). 
192 Id. at 1473. 
193 Id. at 1473.  
UNCONSTITUTIONALLY ILLEGITIMATE DISCRIMINATION 
 
 
 
 
41 
to, at least to some degree, by judges.  As a result, defendants that did in fact 
mean to discriminate, have strong reasons to express insincere but neutral 
reasons for their actions.   Defendants also have strong reasons not admit to 
anything discriminatory in their actions in the first place.  The underlying 
goal can be to disincentize illegitimate bases for decisionmaking.  That is in 
itself an important goal, as I have argued in this Article.   
Moreover, where decisionmaking was overly discriminatory in the 
past, courts may be more suspicious of policymaking, even if justified by 
neutral reasons.  That overview of the role discrimination can play in 
statutes raises the same question discussed in this Article: what does 
evidence of discriminatory intent do to government defenses that it in fact 
acted based on legitimate reasons? The answer in many statutory contexts is 
the same as in constitutional contexts: is there in fact a legitimate reason for 
the action in question.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Intentional discrimination has long rested in an uneasy place in 
constitutional jurisprudence—but it deserves a far more central place in our 
jurisprudence and in our constitutional culture more broadly.194  Worrying 
about how many lawmakers in a multiple member body must have expressed 
unconstitutional intent to lead to a constitutional question is asking a 
question that is often beside the point.  The approach that I have advanced is 
simple: When government makes disparaging remarks, this is strong 
evidence of discriminatory intent.  In turn, discriminatory intent is enough to 
find government action unconstitutional.  
In this Article, I have argued that judges and litigants should focus on 
legitimacy of Government action.  The broad cost of discriminatory intent to 
legitimacy matters and should play an important role in addition to the 
harm, expressive or otherwise, that discriminatory intent causes to victims. 
It is not judicial review of derogatory remarks that is itself “divisive,” but it is 
the failure to carefully review such actions that is costly and can lead to 
social division.195  As a matter of constitutional doctrine and sound theory, 
derogatory and motives should not enter into government. Indeed, for that 
reason, courts may be quite correct to not precisely define the minimum 
tolerable amount of invidious motives that government actors can espouse 
and still safely make policy.  Government officials may be further deterred if 
unsure whether they can insulate policy from discriminatory motives.  To be 
sure, if rules for proving intent are too difficult to satisfy, then constitutional 
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enforcement will be ineffective.  Critics have pointed out as much in the 
Batson v. Kentucky discrimination in jury selection context.  
The cost of discrimination sweeps broadly and can disable and 
delegitimize government.  Overdeterrence is not something we should worry 
about as much about as underdeterrence. Critics of intent tests have long 
argued that the focus of the doctrine should be on remedying actual harm and 
disparate impacts.  I agree that disparate impacts should play an important 
role in discrimination claims, and that other values such as efficiency, 
federalism, and judicial capacity matter.  With a focus on legitimacy of 
government action, however, one can observe that intent and purpose tests 
serve an additional purpose that is otherwise lost.  Rather than serve an 
evidentiary role to ferret out intent, these doctrines serve a more 
fundamental purpose: to ensure government is strongly disincentivized from 
enacting illegitimate derogatory measures.  That goal is not hollow. Intent 
and purpose tests serve a prophylactic purpose, to ward off government 
efforts to make policy out of a desire to disparage groups.   
Discriminatory intent tests serve to protect legitimacy in government.  
While I have identified a range of areas in the doctrine that reflect this 
approach, judges have often not stated it clearly or directly.  In part, this is 
for the good reason courts have often not had a reason to spell out the de-
legitimizing function that expressed discriminatory intent has on the 
Government.  That unconstitutionally illegitimate intent has not often been 
litigated to its logical conclusion in the past is in part a testament to its 
effectiveness in disincentivizing government action that is openly 
discriminatory and derogatory. Moral disapproval or discriminatory intent 
directed against a group does far more than harm the group in one area of 
policymaking.  It comes at a cost to the legitimacy of the government itself.  
For that reason, I argue, the disabling effect of such action on government 
may persist for some time. Unconstitutionally illegitimate intent can 
undermine government defenses or even structural power to act. 
In this Article, I have argued that a legitimacy-focused approach both 
reflects constitutional doctrine and can improve it.  As the Supreme Court 
put it in United States v. Windsor, the Constitution “withdraws” from the 
Government “the power to degrade or demean” individuals.196  This approach 
strongly disincentivizes government action that disparages groups.  
Deterrence serves a Madisonian goal: to strongly incentivize government to 
act to “protect all parties, the weaker as well as the more powerful.”197  If in a 
society, the “stronger faction can readily unite and oppress the weaker,” as 
James Madison wrote in Federalist 51, “anarchy may as truly be said to 
reign.”198  That is why the legitimacy-reinforcing function of discriminatory 
intent doctrine provides such a crucial bulwark for constitutional democracy.  
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